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1 
“HE LOOKS GUILTY”:  REFORMING GOOD CHARACTER 
EVIDENCE TO UNDERCUT THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT 
 Josephine Ross
* 
 
 
 
 
The man before them was noble in appearance, and the shadows played across the planes 
of his face in a way that made their angles harden; his aspect connoted dignity.  And 
there was nothing akin to softness in him anywhere, no part of him that was vulnerable.  
He was, they decided, not like them at all . . . . 
 The jurors’ thoughts portrayed in Snow Falling on Cedars 
 after the accused, Kabuo Miyamoto, testifies.1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
How do juries decide the guilt or innocence of the accused?  In cases 
where identification is at issue, the physical evidence is not conclusive, or 
where credibility is central to determining guilt, juries often look at the 
character of the accused to help piece together what happened.  This is an 
article about good character evidence.  It is also an article about how the 
perceived character of an accused affects the outcome of jury trials. 
 
* Long-term visitor to Boston College Law School.  I have worked in the criminal trial courts of 
Massachusetts for seventeen years, first as a public defender, then as a clinical professor.  Many of the 
insights in this article come from discussing trial strategy with other defense attorneys, watching trials, and 
trying my own cases.  I wish to acknowledge the helpful suggestions on this article from Professors Phyllis 
Goldfarb, Mike Cassidy, Andrew Leipold, and Anthony Farley.  I also wish to thank my valuable research 
assistant, Sarah Forman ’05. 
1. DAVID GUTERSON, SNOW FALLING ON CEDARS 309-10 (1994). 
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The concept of good character evidence is based on the premise that 
someone who has led a morally sound and lawful existence is less likely to 
have committed a crime than someone with a history of bad actions and an 
immoral or amoral approach to the world.  Certainly we use good character 
information in everyday life to infer a lack of propensity.  Imagine you play 
Monopoly with a youngster who never cheats, and one day he short-changes 
you.  Because his prior conduct proves to you that he does not have the 
propensity to cheat, you will conclude he made a mathematical error.  
Similarly, if your neighbor of five years was home the day your house is 
burglarized, you will not suspect your neighbor even though she had the 
opportunity to commit the crime, unless there is something negative about 
your neighbor’s character to make you suspicious.  If you think someone has 
good character, you give her the benefit of the doubt.  Juries are supposed to 
give all criminal defendants the benefit of the doubt, what the law refers to as 
the presumption of innocence.  It is by no means assured that every juror will 
give a defendant the presumption of innocence despite a judge’s instructions.  
Hence, one way to think about good character evidence is that it gives factual 
support to the legal presumption of innocence, rendering it more likely that 
jurors will give the defendant the benefit of the doubt as the law requires.2 
Only certain evidence that informs juries and judges about character is 
actually called “character evidence.”3  This article will review the category 
called “character evidence” and inquire into what the law permits into jury 
trials and what the law excludes.  It asks other questions as well, such as:  what 
role does the character of the accused play in criminal trials; do juries make 
decisions about a defendant’s character based on factors other than what the 
law classifies as “character evidence;” does the lack of character evidence 
contribute to the stereotyping of defendants? 
                                                 
2. Conversely, the rule against bad character evidence is recognized as a derivative to the 
presumption of innocence, or “concomitant of the presumption of innocence.”  United States v. Myers, 550 
F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977). 
3. This article will also discuss evidence that does not fall under the definition of “character 
evidence” that has been introduced for some purpose such as background or motive, which reflects on the 
defendant’s character in the eyes of the jury.  See infra Section II. 
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Many scholars have commented on the government’s use of bad character 
evidence; some encourage its expansion, while others condemn its 
proliferation.4  A number of these authors discuss good character; few have 
concentrated on positive character evidence in their scholarly inquiry.5  In 
contrast, this article centers its discussion on men and women charged with 
crimes who would benefit if they were allowed to bring in witnesses to discuss 
their life.6 
In addition, this article is making a second claim, namely that jury trials 
are all about character.  It would be a mistake to think of character evidence in 
trials only in terms of the rules called character evidence.  Juries are making 
character judgments, and prosecutors are disparaging the character of the 
defendants in every trial.  From the opening statement where the prosecutor 
sets forth his accusation, to the closing argument where the prosecutor tries to 
make the criminal charge stick, the accused is being labeled a criminal.  The 
                                                 
4. For writing that opposes the expansion of bad character evidence, see, e.g., Robert D. Dodson, 
What Went Wrong With Federal Rule of Evidence 609:  A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior 
Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1999); Russell L. Jones, “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It!”:  An 
Unnecessary Tampering With A Well Established Rule:  Louisiana Code of Evidence Admits Criminal 
Propensity Evidence, 48 LOY. L .REV. 17 (2002); David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence 
Prohibition:  Foundations of the Rule Against Trial By Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161 (1998); Miguel A. 
Méndez, Character Evidence Reconsidered:  “People Do Not Seem to be Predictable Characters”, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1998); Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!:  A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in 
Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663 (1998); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of 
Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1544-45 (1999).  For a further list of scholarship critical of the expansion 
of bad character evidence, see Leonard supra at 1215 n.7. 
Some writing that supports expansion of bad character evidence:  Jason M. Brauser, Intrinsic or 
Extrinsic?:  The Confusing Distinction Between Inextricably Intertwined Evidence and Other Crimes 
Evidence Under Rule 404(b), 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1582, 1618 (1994); Thomas J. Leach, “Propensity” 
Evidence and FRE 404:  A Proposed Amended Rule with an Accompanying “Plain English” Jury 
Instruction, 68 TENN. L. REV. 825, 827 (2001); Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 
1998 BYU L. REV. 1547, 1620; Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b):  The Fictitious Ban on 
Character Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181 (1998); Roger C. Park, Character at 
the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 756 (1998); Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone:  Individualizing 
Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 120 (1993) [hereinafter Taslitz, 
Myself Alone]; H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct:  Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice 
in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 891 (1982); Thomas J. Reed, The Character Evidence Defense:  
Acquittal Based on Good Character Evidence, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 345, 378-92 (1997) (urging more good 
character evidence since “personality” or character tend to be stable across situations).  Reed also suggests 
that more psychological exploration of prisoners, which he calls “deviant populations,” may help predict 
criminality.  Id. at 378-82. 
5. See, e.g., Leach, supra note 4, at 860; Méndez, supra note 4, at 886; Melilli, supra note 4, at 
1625; Park, supra note 4, at 745-46; Uviller, supra note 4, at 854-56 (arguing that in practice the rules are 
asymmetrical in favor of the defendant). 
 
6. This article will not consider how character is used for and against witnesses and victims; that 
will be left for another day. 
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laws of libel and slander teach us that asserting criminality is libel or slander 
per se.7  While there is a huge range in style and aggressiveness on the part of 
prosecutors, the force of the accusation itself can counteract the presumption 
of innocence.  Despite the judge’s caution to the jury that the defendant is 
presumed to be innocent, there is always a danger that the jury will assume 
that the state would not have brought an indictment or complaint unless the 
defendant was probably guilty.  The danger of a lack of presumed innocence is 
magnified when the defendant is poor or a member of an unpopular minority.  
Good character evidence should be understood as a defensive tool, designed to 
off-set the damage caused by the indictment and opening statement. 
Section I discusses literature which aids us in thinking about how 
character is known in life and literature and how different that process is 
within trials.  Trials generally offer jurors only short-cuts to character, such as 
a person’s job, age, race and marital status. 
Section II shatters the myth that criminal defendants have the upper hand 
where character evidence is concerned.  Part A looks at how weak and 
restricted good character evidence currently is, while Part B sets forth the tools 
possessed by the prosecution once a defendant introduces good character.  Part 
C looks at the burgeoning use of prior bad acts in criminal cases, and discusses 
how prior bad acts operate to convince jurors of a defendant’s bad character. 
Section III examines the way in which character affects trials from 
beginning to end.  Part A argues that good character evidence must be 
understood as part of a general attempt by defense attorneys to convince juries 
to see their clients as humans as opposed to “the other.”  Part B considers laws 
on libel and slander to help the reader understand the force of the accusation 
itself in criminal trials.  Good character evidence must be understood as a 
defensive attempt to off-set this type of character assassination.  Part C 
considers how cultural bias serves to enhance the force of the accusation 
against members of unpopular groups.  I argue that good character evidence 
possesses the potential in some cases to correct stereotyping and bias, and 
encourages jurors to actually grant the legally promised “presumption of 
innocence.” 
Section IV addresses the question of symmetry.  If symmetry is the goal, 
then it would be easy to forgo all good character evidence and ask the 
government to relinquish evidence of other bad acts by the accused.  However, 
the rules were intended to be asymmetrical in favor of the accused.  Allowing 
                                                 
7. Assuming the assertion of criminality is false.  See infra Section IV Part B. 
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more good character evidence should not encourage more bad character 
evidence under the name of equality, for the benefits and concern regarding 
these two types of evidence are very different. 
In the conclusion, I argue that since good character evidence is an 
important safeguard, the rules should be improved to allow for better 
communication to juries concerning the good character of the accused. 
 
I.  CHARACTER PORTRAYED IN TWO LITERARY WORKS WHERE THE 
PROTAGONIST IS ON TRIAL 
 
 
 
[Our lawyer] often seemed to relish the fact that we had so much property, the one thing 
that should prove to the judge the quality of our citizenship.  He used the words 
synonymously:  upstanding, moral, hardworking, four hundred acres, sixty head of 
cattle.8 
 
                                                 
8. JANE HAMILTON, A MAP OF THE WORLD 239 (1994). 
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In Map of the World, a novel by Jane Hamilton, the protagonist is charged 
with sexually molesting a boy.9  As she heads for trial by jury, conviction 
seems likely, for the force of the accusation itself will cause the jury to view 
her as someone capable of such an act.  We know this hero Alice well, having 
spent many pages listening to her thoughts and observing her actions.  As 
readers, we know she is incapable of such an act, that her character alone 
should bring back a verdict of not guilty, but how will a jury know her, know 
her integrity, her moral consideration of others that would prove her unlikely 
to commit a criminal offense? 
Instead of evidence about Alice’s integrity, the jury is given the 
superficial emblems that substitute for character evidence in courtrooms across 
America.  Alice has a good defense lawyer who understands appearances.  Her 
lawyer lines up the appearances in her favor, the devoted husband in the front 
row dressed in his best suit, Alice in a nice middle class dress, and their four 
hundred acres.  The hero in Map of the World was fortunate to have the indicia 
of good character; she was a married white woman with two children and a 
working husband standing by her.10 
The novel is accurate in its portrayal of how a jury would be shown 
character under the present jury system.  One of the facts, or one could say 
defects, of the American jury system is that jurors measure the character of 
witnesses and defendants by shortcuts, such as whether the person has a job, 
and the kind of a job they hold.  These shortcuts are intrinsically 
interconnected with biases, including that of class, race, gender, sexual 
orientation, and immigration status.11  For example, the type of job a witness 
has is intrinsically connected with class.  Joblessness is also connected to class 
                                                 
9. Id. 
10. The protagonist in Map of the World, Alice, is fortunate she has the material trappings of 
credibility as measured by jurors.  Knowing that appearances serve as a substitute for any real discussion of 
character during a trial, Alice’s attorney is devastated when her husband sells the land before the trial.  It will 
effect whether the jury sees her as someone capable of such an act, or someone unlikely to commit such an 
act.  Id. at 239. 
11. Attractiveness is also a superficial aspect of the defendant that potentially effects the likelihood 
of jurors to convict.  See MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 155 (1978). 
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and to gender, for a mother on welfare will be viewed by a jury very 
differently than a middle class woman without a job, and both will be viewed 
differently than a man without a job. 
Most of the time these biases are so ingrained as to be invisible to lawyers 
as well as to the jury.  For example, one year as I was critiquing closing 
arguments by defense attorneys in a refresher course, I noticed that most of the 
lawyers started their arguments by pointing out that their female client was 
married.  It was a drunk driving case, and they used defendant’s marital status 
as a shortcut to bring out many aspects of their argument:  that she was not a 
big drinker, that she did not usually drive if she did drink, and that she was 
scared at being pulled over and ordered to walk a straight line.  To these 
lawyers, the fact that she was married helped prove these facts.  Had it been a 
class at the law school, I would have asked them if their closings reflected their 
own opinion about married women, their view of how juries decide guilt, or 
both.  I also would have inquired if they thought the fact that she was Latina 
enhanced the value of her marital status.  But, I was asked to teach 
effectiveness, not theory.  Lawyers do not have to be conscious of the 
assumptions they make in order to be effective.  Collectively, these lawyers 
had accumulated a great deal of knowledge about how juries decide cases.12 
Hamilton’s novel is about character.  It is about how rare it is for people to 
really know each other, or even for a husband and wife to understand each 
other.  The one good friend who really knows and understands the protagonist, 
explains her to the protagonist’s husband.  Thus, he finally begins to 
understand the protagonist the way the reader does.  In contrast, the jury does 
not understand her, and is not really given an opportunity.  Appearances 
substitute for character at the trial.  The good friend who translates Alice’s 
character to the husband does not do so for the jury, for the attorney has no 
intention of explaining the real Alice to the jury.  Moreover, to really 
understand the protagonist, one would need to understand her grief over the 
death of a child who was in her care.  In the context of the trial, this is a prior 
bad act, and one that the attorney successfully fights to prevent the government 
from bringing before the jury. 
One of the key pieces of the prosecution’s evidence is Alice’s statement to 
the police, “I hurt everyone.”  Readers of Map of the World understand the 
                                                 
12. Using marital status as a shortcut may also be connected to class, culture or sexual orientation of 
the defendant.  See infra Section II Part C. 
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statement “I hurt everyone” because they know that Alice was suffering from 
depression caused by guilt over the drowning death of a child in her care.  At 
trial, her lawyer does not want her to explain that because it brings out her 
previous bad behavior.  Thus, in a scene that highlights the tension between 
truth and trial even for innocent defendants, he cautions her to omit any 
mention of the drowned child.  At trial, when asked about her statement, she 
disappoints her lawyer by explaining her guilt over the death of her friend’s 
child.  Although she was supposed to stick to a courtroom version of truth, her 
own sense of truth, the fuller version, prevents her from doing so.  Hamilton is 
right that the structure of a trial does not generally serve to bring out truth the 
way we think of it in novels.  It does not bring out truth of character.  Because 
jurors are given so little real information about the defendant’s character, it is a 
small wonder that they grasp short-cuts in assessing the character of the 
accused. 
Snow Falling on Cedars13 provides a neat contrast to Map of the World.  
Published within one year of each other, both novels revolve around jury trials 
that flesh out the dynamics of community and status.  In Snow Falling on 
Cedars, Kabuo Miyamoto is a Japanese-American fisherman charged with 
murder in the Pacific Northwest during the 1950’s.  As the quote at the 
beginning of this article indicates, the jurors make determinations about the 
character of the accused in order to aid their determination of guilt or 
innocence.  They try to decide if he is the type of person capable of killing a 
man, the type of person likely to kill someone.  The inquiry is superficial and 
relies on stereotypes.  To the extent a jury relies on racial stereotypes, their 
deliberations would be considered improper in the highly unlikely event that 
these thoughts became part of the record of the case.14  However, courts rarely 
review jurors’ thought processes. 
                                                 
13. GUTERSON, supra note 1. 
14. See the Worcester, Massachusetts trial of Benjamin La Guer, who was convicted of rape by an 
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all-white jury.  Later, a juror revealed that the deliberations were tainted by racism.  One juror claimed 
another juror referred to La Guer as “a spic.”  William F. Doherty, Convicted Rapist Files Lawsuit Seeking 
Hearing, Alleging Racial Bias, BOSTON GLOBE, July 17, 1999, at B8.  Reminiscent of Snow Falling on 
Cedars, one juror allegedly remarked:  “The goddamn spic is guilty just sitting there; look at him. Why 
bother having the trial.”  Commonwealth v. Laguer, 630 N.E.2d 618, 619 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).  However, 
in 1994, the state appeals court rejected his arguments that he be granted a new trial because of racial bias.  
Id. at 621. 
 
After years of petitioning the state to conduct DNA testing, results from tests done in 2002 did not 
exonerate La Guer, but rather pointed strongly towards his guilt.  Doug Hanchett, DNA Boomerangs on 
Con—Test Upholds Rape Conviction, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 24, 2002, at 2. 
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Even though Kabuo has a devoted wife, and both he and his wife testify, 
they are both perceived as aliens.  In addition to being married, he also was a 
veteran of World War II in the United States Army.  Not only does this not 
sway the jury in his favor, it works against him, for the jury takes his prowess 
as a soldier in the United States Army as proof that he could and would kill.15  
The defense lawyer’s closing argument to forgo prejudice is not enough, 
especially as it is offset by the prosecution’s description of the defendant as a 
cunning schemer, a narrative that fit comfortably into existing stereotypes of 
that period.  The novel rings true and presents a realistic jumping-off point for 
our inquiry into the nature of race in determining character in criminal trials. 
Were we to transport Snow Falling on Cedars into a contemporary trial, it 
is unlikely the attorney could do anything more for his client than caution 
against prejudice in his closing argument.  As seen in the evidence section 
below,16 under current law, Kabuo’s history as a survivor of an internment 
camp during World War II might be allowed in to explain why he killed, but 
not to create a full picture of a man claiming innocence.  That would be 
considered irrelevant and a ploy to create sympathy. 
Should there be a narrative of innocence that the defense could give to the 
jury that would educate them about Kabuo’s life, character and background?17 
 Is there character evidence that would aid the jury in realizing that he was not 
a likely murderer? 
I have taken two narratives of innocence from literature.  The contrast 
between the narratives that readers have available to learn the truth, and the 
narratives that juries have available to determine truth, should make us 
question the limitations on character evidence in jury trials.  Literature teaches 
us that character and conduct are interrelated and complex, and that more 
information is needed to understand character than simple recitation of what a 
person was allegedly seen doing at a certain time.  “Juries are supposed to 
evaluate facts as we evaluate literature,” Professor Katherine Baker recently 
wrote.18  “They are supposed to determine truth based on the complexities of 
                                                 
15. GUTERSON, supra at note 1, at 285. 
16. See infra Section II. 
17. The jury learns that the defendant failed to inform the police that he was with the deceased sailor 
the night he was found dead, evidence that put Miyamoto’s character for truthfulness in a bad light.  Unlike 
the jury, the reader learns that Miyamoto followed a code of honor and honesty.  GUTERSON, supra note 1.  
As Guterson states:  “The heart of any other, because it had a will, would remain forever mysterious.”  Id. at 
345. 
18. Katherine Baker, A Wigmorian Defense of Feminist Method, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 862 (1998). 
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the characters in front of them, not on a set of universal truths or types that 
might be true on average.”19 
 
II.  THE MYTH OF ASYMMETRY BETWEEN GOOD AND BAD CHARACTER 
EVIDENCE 
 
 
 
[I]t is not probable that in a single moment a person, who during his past life, had 
conducted himself in the way Mr. Jones has would enter into that corrupt agreement. 
                                                 
19. Id. at 862. 
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 —Opening statement of English defense barrister in Jones’ Trial.20 
 
To those who do not practice criminal law, the rules of evidence appear 
asymmetrical when it comes to character evidence.  In theory, every state and 
federal court allows an accused person to introduce evidence of good character 
in their defense.21  Defense lawyers may call witnesses to the stand who can 
attest to the defendant’s honesty, integrity, or other positive personality traits.  
Good character evidence may be put on regardless of whether the accused 
takes the stand on her own behalf.  This right to prove good character is “so 
deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional 
proportions.”22  It joins the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and the right to confront one’s accusers, as one of the 
hallmarks of a system designed to protect the accused.23 
                                                 
20. The King v. Jones, 31 How. St. Tr. 251, 310 (1809). 
21. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).  Many states have adopted rules similar to the federal rules, and 
some states follow common law that also permits good character evidence.  See infra note 46. 
22. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) advisory committee’s notes. 
23. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.12 (1999).  See also 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 101 (2d ed. 1994). 
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The black letter law also appears to prohibit the government from 
introducing bad character evidence against the accused, while allowing the 
defense to introduce good moral character in favor of the accused.  Rule 404(a) 
states that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion” except to rebut character evidence offered by the 
accused.24  Thus it appears that the defense chooses whether character 
evidence will be part of the trial and it appears that the government may not 
bring up propensity or bad character unless the defense raises good character.  
Rule 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith” although it may be “admissible for other 
purposes . . . .”25  To read the rules of evidence, one would think that character 
evidence is an area where the defendant is given all the advantages, coddled 
some would say, while the government is hamstrung from presenting 
damaging evidence.  This configuration is misleading. 
In the practice of criminal law, good character evidence and bad character 
evidence remain asymmetrical, but reality reverses the asymmetry.  Trial by 
trial, there is a great deal more evidence of bad character than good character 
introduced into criminal prosecutions.  There are three primary factors that 
account for this uneven pattern, two of which involve evidentiary rules.  First, 
the right of good character evidence is a mirage.26  Second, a good deal of 
evidence is now paraded before juries which the jury is likely to use as proof 
of bad character even though ostensibly it was admitted for reasons other than 
proof of bad moral character.27  Third, many defendants have checkered pasts 
or criminal records, even if they did not commit the crime charged.  This third 
factor may be inherent in our criminal justice system, but it exacerbates the 
evidentiary imbalance of the first and second factors which will be set forward 
below. 
 
                                                 
24. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) & 404(a)(1).  Note a change to the federal rules allows prosecutors to 
bring in evidence of a negative character trait once defense opens the door by bringing in similar evidence of 
a negative trait against the complaining witness.  FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
25. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  Note that in 1994, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Evidence 
to specifically allow bad character evidence in cases alleging sexual assault and child molestation.  FED. R. 
EVID. 413-415.  For a discussion on how the new rules embrace propensity theory for the first time, see 
James J. Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence of Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders:  A Poorly 
Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 105 (1994). 
26. See infra Section III Parts A, B. 
27. See infra Section III Part C. 
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A.  The Hollow Right of Good Character Evidence 
 
 
Everyone who spoke on my behalf was asked by the magistrate’s clerk if he knew that I 
was homosexual and replied that he did.  This question was in each case followed by the 
words, uttered in a voice hoarse with incredulity, “and yet you describe him as 
respectable?”  All said, “Yes.” 
—Quentin Crisp, a flamboyant gay writer, charged with soliciting sex in England during 
World War II, tells how his character witnesses helped win him an acquittal.28 
 
                                                 
28. QUENTIN CRISP, THE NAKED CIVIL SERVANT 162-64 (1968). 
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I am a clinical professor in a criminal defense clinic.  Every year as I 
prepare my students for jury trials, I discuss character evidence with them to 
see if it could be useful in their cases.  Initially, those representing likable 
clients with no criminal records are enthusiastic.  However, this enthusiasm 
fades when they do the research and confirm their understanding of the law 
with me.  In Massachusetts, character evidence is limited to evidence of the 
client’s reputation.  In other words, a character witness may say something of 
this sort:  “I know four people that know the accused.  I know she has a good 
reputation because we talked about her when she was arrested and everyone 
was surprised because she wasn’t the type of person to do something 
violent.”29  In jurisdictions like Massachusetts, witnesses cannot testify to their 
own opinion of the client’s good moral character, nor to specific events that 
would lead a jury to know her good character.30  Students do not envision this 
evidence helping their client, or at least not enough to be worth the energy to 
find witnesses for that testimony when there is so much else to do to prepare 
for trial.  They are discouraged even before they learn about the dangers of 
cross-examination once defense counsel presents good character witnesses.  I 
tell them their attitude is similar to that of many lawyers.31 
The first difficulty in presenting good character evidence is the manner in 
which evidence may be presented to the jury.  The rules choose among three 
types of evidence from which to prove character:  (1) testimony about the 
defendant’s conduct that reflects character; (2) a witness’s opinion based on 
observations of the defendant and his conduct; and (3)  the reputation of the 
defendant.  In other areas of evidence, the rules encourage witnesses to retell 
their direct observations and specific facts they observed.  In a few instances, a 
witness may give his opinion.  Rarely do we see reputation admitted into trial 
under other areas of evidence.  Character evidence rules are counter-intuitive.  
                                                 
29. For a slightly different method of introducing reputation, see EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, 
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 145-47 (3d ed. 1995). 
30. Massachusetts law is contrary to Federal Rule 404.  See cases cited infra note 46. 
31. This is but one of many instances where students in the defense clinic learn that the notion of the 
defendants’ rights as taught in regular law school classes is inaccurate.  The obfuscation in the character 
evidence area creates the impression among the bar that defendants have all these rights, without actually 
giving real defendants at trial any advantages. 
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The third type of evidence is always allowed; the second type is sometimes 
allowed; and the first type, almost never. 
In eleven jurisdictions, character witnesses may testify only to the 
defendant’s reputation, not to their own opinion about her good character.32  
Reputation evidence is weak hearsay; the witness is only allowed to testify to 
what he heard others say about the accused.  If it is a battery case and the 
defendant is arguing that he never hit the alleged victim, the witnesses cannot 
say they believe the defendant to be peaceful.  They can only say they heard 
other people say she was peaceful.  This is obviously the weakest kind of 
evidence and it is also the most difficult to obtain.  First of all, people do not 
generally stand around gossiping about someone’s good qualities, and even 
when they do, they are likely to forget precisely what was said.  Second, the 
law requires that it be a community reputation, so the trial judge may exclude 
the defense witnesses if he determines that the reputation is limited to too 
small a group.33  Many people do not have a reputation in the large community 
in which they live or work.  Consider a woman who stayed home with children 
for years and is just heading back to work.  Good character evidence is an 
impossibility for her.  Good character witnesses are also out of reach for those 
who are self-employed or work for small companies, unless they happen to be 
one of the handful of people actively involved in the neighborhood in which 
they live.34 
It is no revelation that reputation is weaker than opinion evidence, and 
that both are weaker than evidence of conduct.  The courts are well aware of 
the weak state of this defense right.  As one court put it, “it is an evidentiary 
anomaly that—in proving general moral character, the law prefers hearsay, 
rumor, and gossip, to personal knowledge of the witness.”35  McCormick 
notes:  “As one moves from the specific to the general in this fashion, the 
pungency and persuasiveness of the evidence declines, but so does its tendency 
to arouse undue prejudice, to confuse and distract, and to raise time-consuming 
side issues.”36  The limitations on the type of good character evidence 
                                                 
32. See infra note 46. 
33. See Commonwealth v. LaPierre, 408 N.E.2d 883 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (holding trial judge 
justified in prohibiting opinion of three fellow workers because it was too small a group to constitute a 
reputation). 
34. The court listened in amusement when one of my clients referred to himself as a prominent figure 
because he had been involved in planning First Night Worcester Activities.  But when I consider all my 
clients, he had more “community” ties than most. 
35. Simpkins v. State, 256 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979). 
 
36. CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 788 (John William Strong ed., 4th 
ed. 1992). 
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presented is partially explained as the protection of judicial resources, 
containing the length of trials.37  Judicial resources are a real concern when 
considering whether to allow actual instances of good conduct.  However, 
since reputation evidence is only marginally quicker to put on than opinion 
evidence, it follows that some rule-makers are not bothered by the weakness of 
reputation evidence.  In fact, the weakness of the evidence may serve a 
purpose, the purpose of discouraging lawyers from exercising this “deeply 
imbedded right.”  How else to explain the continuation of a mistake, decades 
after it was uncovered by Henry Wigmore?38 
                                                 
37. The issue of scarce judicial resources will be discussed more fully.  See infra Section IV. 
38. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1981 (2d ed. 1923). 
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In 1809, an English judge was irritated with a defense barrister, and 
probably misspoke in limiting the testimony of the fourth character witness for 
the defense.  This oral reasoning changed the course of evidence.  Lord 
Ellenborough, C.J. interrupted the fourth character witness and stated:  “[I]t is 
reputation; it is not what a person knows.”39  This statement was then seized 
upon by English treatise writers as a refinement of existing evidence law.40  
Although records from the nineteenth century case indicate Lord Ellenborough 
did say what he was reputed to have said, a reading of the case itself indicates 
that he did not intend to limit character evidence to reputation alone, but just to 
avoid specific incidences.  The defendant Jones was charged with graft while 
holding office as a commissary general of the West Indies.  His barrister called 
six character witnesses to testify to “what his general conduct and character 
has been,”41 as he explained in his opening.  Lord Ellenborough, C.J. did not 
object to the defense’s description of what these witnesses would say.  Nor did 
Lord Ellenborough object when the first witnesses spoke of their opinion of 
the defendant’s character, except when the character witnesses strayed into 
issues such as whether he reduced the expense of the army.42  Moreover, the 
previous year the same judge, Lord Ellenborough, questioned a defense 
witness as follows:  “From your knowledge of Mr. Davison’s character and 
conduct, do you think him capable of committing a fraud?”43  Clearly 
Massachusetts law and the other states that follow the reputation-only rule 
have built their jurisprudence upon a misunderstanding.44 
Wigmore urged that the mistake be remedied.  He referred to reputation 
evidence as “the second-hand, irresponsible product of multiplied guesses and 
gossip which we term ‘reputation.’”45  Eventually, with dissension, the federal 
rules were changed to permit opinion evidence in addition to reputation.  
Although many states have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1), which 
                                                 
39. The King v. Jones, 31 How. St. Tr. 251, 310 (K.B. 1809).  In the middle of the seventeenth 
century, England gave defendants the right to put on witnesses to prove their innocence, and by the end of 
the seventeenth century, this included character witnesses.  Reed, supra note 4, at 382. 
40. See WIGMORE, supra note 38 (Chadbourne Rev. 1978).  The treatise writers in turn influenced 
the appeals court in R. v. Rowton, Leigh & Co. 520, 10 COX CRIM. CAS. 25 (1865).  The original federal 
rules excluded opinion, but the rules were later changed to conform with early English law. 
41. Jones, 31 How. St. Tr. at 308. 
42. “What was his general character for integrity is the question,” Lord Ellenborough informed 
counsel for the accused during the first character witness’s testimony, rather than whether his department 
was conducted in the best possible manner.  Id. at 309. 
43. The King v. Davison, 31 How. St. Tr. 100, 189 (K.B. 1809). 
44. WIGMORE, supra note 38.  “The isolated phrase . . . in Jones’ Trial . . . being misunderstood, has 
proven a great stumbling block . . . .” 
45. MCCORMICK, supra note 36, at 789 & n.10(b) (quoting Wigmore). 
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allows opinion evidence as well as reputation, the mistake is still law in eleven 
states.46 
                                                 
46. Of the eleven states that prohibit opinion evidence, five states have codified the exclusion of 
opinion evidence.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.405 (West 1995); LA. CODE OF EVID. ANN., art. 405 (West 1995); 
ME. R. EVID. 405; VT. R. EVID. 405; WASH. R. EVID. 405.  Six others bar it through case law.  E.g., Powell 
v. Georgia, 29 S.E. 309 (Ga. 1897); Taylor v. Georgia, 336 S.E.2d 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Hirschman v. 
Illinois, 100 Ill. 568 (1882); Illinois v. Williams, 649 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. 1995); Massachusetts v. Belton, 225 
N.E.2d 53 (Mass. 1967); Missouri v. Wellman, 161 S.W. 795 (Mo. 1913); Missouri v. Brown, 718 S.W.2d 
493, 494 (Mo. 1986); New York v. Van Gaashek, 82 N.E. 718 (N.Y. 1907), overuled by New York v. 
Barber, 541 N.E.2d 394, 395 (N.Y. 1989); Harrison v. Virginia, 79 Va. 374 (1884); Hoke v. Virginia, 377 
S.E.2d 595 (Va. 1989).  For a commentary on the Illinois rule, see Marc R. Kadish & Jason J. Elmore, 
Illinois’ Grotesquely Outdated Ban of Opinion Evidence in Criminal Cases, 86 ILL. B.J. 268 (1998). 
The Federal Rules of Evidence no longer limit testimony about character to reputation alone, allowing 
the witness to give their opinion of the accused’s character if pertinent.  FED. R. EVID. 405.  The most recent 
state to adopt language similar to the Federal Rules was Delaware, which amended the Delaware Uniform 
Rules of Evidence in 2001 to include opinion evidence as a method of proving character.  See DEL. UNIF. R. 
EVID. 405(a). 
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Although there was historical precedent to do so, the federal rules still do 
not permit the strongest kind of evidence, namely testimony on direct 
examination as to particular acts.47  Specific examples of good character are 
prohibited.  If a man accused of stealing once returned a wallet he found with 
the money still in it to a stranger, this fact is never set before the jury.  Instead, 
the jury may only hear the opinions of witnesses as to the defendant’s 
character (in this case, an opinion about his honesty), and in eleven 
jurisdictions, not even that.  There was a time in England when defendants 
were entitled to present evidence of their good deeds, but this was eliminated 
in the nineteenth century.48  Powerful, convincing evidence is now left out, and 
only a shadow of the accused’s good character remains. 
                                                 
47. See FED. R. EVID. 405. 
48. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1981(c).  Professor Reed writes that in the good character area, a 
“jury should know what the basis for the [witness’s] opinion is in order to evaluate that opinion.”  Reed, 
supra note 4, at 390-91.  He points out that experts are allowed to explain the basis of their expert opinion 
under Rules 703 and 705 of the Federal Rules.  Id. at 390. 
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The right to introduce reputation and opinion evidence of good character 
is also circumscribed by many courts.  As gatekeepers, judges sometimes 
exclude reputation evidence because of insufficient foundation or because the 
time period of that reputation is deemed too early or too late to be relevant.49  
Even where foundational requirements are met, judges may still prevent 
character witnesses from taking the stand by ruling that the preferred evidence 
is irrelevant to the particular charge.  Good character has been sub-divided into 
character traits such as peacefulness, honesty or sobriety, with certain 
character traits relevant only to certain crimes.50  Although whether the 
defendant is law abiding would seem to be part of every case, courts have 
ruled that general good character is irrelevant to the charge.51  For example, 
                                                 
49. Lutz v. Colorado, 293 P.2d 646, 649 (Colo. 1956) (holding four or five years before event and 
several years after event deemed too remote); Smith v. Alabama, 72 So. 316, 318 (Ala. 1916) (holding 
reputation between arrest and trial irrelevant). 
50. Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence speaks of a “pertinent trait of character.”  See Illinois 
v. Kendall, 192 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ill. 1934) (holding reputation for truth and veracity has no bearing on 
whether defendant committed a violent crime); Oregon v. VanNatta, 945 P.2d 1062, 1063 (Or. App. 1997) 
(holding evidence of a submissive personality deemed irrelevant to a duress defense). 
51. See Gillespie, 4 City H. Rec. 154 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 1819) (holding defendant’s good character 
ruled inadmissible because the offense of assault and battery does not necessarily involve “moral turpitude”). 
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one court held that good moral behavior is too broad to be relevant to a child 
molestation charge,52 while another court ruled that reputation in the business 
community is irrelevant to a charge of possession with intent to distribute.53  In 
one instance, a court held that good moral character was not relevant to the 
issue of whether the defendant was guilty of draft evasion.54 
                                                                                                                 
 Ironically, in immigration law the concept of a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude has been expanding 
at such a rate that the INS took the position in two cases that shoplifting was a crime of moral turpitude.  See 
Da Rosa Silva v. INS, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (E.D. Pa. 2003); United States v. Samaei, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 
1227 (M.D. Fla. 2003). 
52. Washington v. Griswold, 991 P.2d 657 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding good moral behavior is 
irrelevant in child molestation charge because it is too broad).  The defendant should have offered a 
reputation for “good sexual moral reputation.”  See also North Carolina v. Waggoner, 506 S.E.2d 738, 743 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (holding expert testimony concerning defendant’s general psychiatric/psychological 
profile was properly excluded as irrelevant to issue of whether the accused committed a sexual offense); 
North Carolina v. Mustafa, 437 S.E.2d 906, 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (holding honorable discharge from the 
military properly excluded because good military record is irrelevant to the issue of defendant’s guilt or 
innocence of rape).  But see United States v. Han, 230 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding exclusion of 
good character was harmless error in case of travel with intent to engage in sexual act with minor). 
53. Haralson v. Georgia, 479 S.E.2d 115, 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
54. Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945).  See also Harris v. United States, 
412 F.2d 384, 388 (9th Cir. 1969). 
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Where the crime charged does not specifically involve dishonesty, such as 
a violent crime or drug distribution, courts may prohibit a defendant from 
presenting his reputation for honesty.55  Even where a defendant takes the 
stand, courts have been known to preclude testimony about the defendant’s 
honesty, ruling it irrelevant because the prosecutor never impeached the 
integrity of the defendant on cross-examination.56  One court held this 
evidence to be irrelevant while simultaneously observing that the trial’s 
“central issue was which of the two witnesses, defendant or the child, was 
telling the truth.”57  Doesn’t a prosecutor’s closing argument disputing the 
defendant’s testimony imply that the accused lied?  Doesn’t accusing someone 
of a crime imply an accusation that the person possesses the character to 
commit that crime?58 
All the limitations on the form of good character evidence fit poorly with 
the notion that good character evidence is a fundamental right. 
 
B.  The Penalty for Good Character Evidence 
 
 
                                                 
55. Mack v. Lynaugh, 754 F. Supp. 1116, 1125 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that truthfulness was not 
at issue where the defendant was charged with aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon); State v. 
Weaverling, 523 S.E.2d 787, 793 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (stating defendant was not entitled to offer character 
evidence of his truthfulness where his credibility had not been attacked and where truthfulness is not 
pertinent to a sex charge). 
56. United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1055 (5th Cir. 1979) (ruling that the trait of truthfulness 
was not pertinent to the criminal charges of conspiracy to distribute heroin or possession of heroin.  The 
court refused to allow evidence of truthfulness after the defendant took the stand). 
We find no evidence of an attack upon Jackson’s character for truthfulness.  During the cross-
examination the government attorney questioned Jackson closely about his version of the facts and 
pointed out conflicts between that testimony and the testimony of other witnesses.  However, “(t)he 
mere fact that a witness is contradicted by other evidence in the case does not constitute an attack 
upon his reputation for truth and veracity.” 
Id. (quoting Kauz v. United States, 188 F.2d 9, 10 (5th Cir. 1951)); United States v. Dring, 930 F.2d 687, 
689 (9th Cir. 1991); Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1960).  Cf. United States v. Smith, 
46 F.3d 1223, 1233 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding trial judge erred in excluding character witnesses to show 
truthfulness but objection not preserved). 
57. Oregon v. Adonri, 923 P.2d 658, 660 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).  The appeals court there held that 
defendant should have been prevented from introducing testimony that he was a truthful person because it 
was not relevant to the charge of sexual misconduct towards a minor.  This was the ruling even though the 
defendant had taken the stand in his own defense (and therefore arguably put his credibility into issue). 
 Ironically, the court went on at length to explain that credibility was at issue in the case.  See generally id. 
 
58. See infra Section IV Parts A, B.  This is quite a separate inquiry from impeachment with criminal 
convictions allowed under the Federal Rules of Evidence.  See FED. R. EVID. 609. 
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[Character evidence] seems to gather mist which discussion serves only to thicken, and 
which we can scarcely hope to dissipate by anything further we can add. 
 —An opinion by Judge Learned Hand.59 
 
                                                 
59. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 474 n.5 (1948) (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 
1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.). 
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Once the defendant is said to have “opened the door” by introducing a 
defendant’s good character, the prosecutor can rebut with bad character 
evidence.  In contrast to the short affirmance of good character or reputation 
for good character generally allowed on direct, cross-examination of the 
character witness can be devastating.60  The prosecutor is not limited to 
opinion and reputation but may bring up specific instances of bad conduct 
during cross-examination.61  Nor is the prosecutor limited to convictions.  As 
long as the prosecutor has a good faith basis for believing the alleged bad fact, 
he may question the witness about whether the witness has heard this alleged 
fact.  Although the prosecutor cannot prove the bad acts by extrinsic evidence 
and must rely on the answers given on the witness stand, the cross-
examination may still do more than neutralize a witness. 
For example, a character witness may be asked on cross-examination 
whether he has heard that the accused was arrested for an unrelated crime two 
years ago.  If the witness says yes, then the jury will hold it against the 
defendant that she was arrested.  If the witness says no, the jury will still 
probably hold it against the defendant that she was arrested despite general 
instructions that a lawyer’s questions are not evidence.62  This question is 
considered permissible under the “opened door policy” even where an arrest 
did not lead to conviction, potentially even where it was a false arrest.63 
                                                 
60. However, the rules generally do not permit a prosecutor to prove bad character through 
independent witnesses.  FED. R. EVID. 404.  Rather, most often, the government must rely on cross-
examining defense witnesses to bring out the damaging particulars.  FED. R. EVID. 405. 
61. See FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee’s notes (stating the proposition that evidence in the 
form of “specific instances of conduct” possess “the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice”). 
62. A judge should instruct the jury that it is the answers the witness gives that matter and that the 
questions themselves are not evidence.  Nevertheless, where jurors think well of the prosecuting attorney 
who poses the question, jurors would be unlikely to think the prosecutor made up the prior arrest.  More 
likely, they would think the witness did not know of the arrest or is pretending not to know.  This is one of 
many instances where lawyers generally believe it difficult or impossible for jurors to follow instructions. 
63. See, e.g., United States v. Morla-Trinidad 100 F. 3d 1, 4-6 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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Allowing prior arrests to be discussed in court is particularly troubling 
because it undercuts the presumption of innocence in the present trial.  If a jury 
is allowed to draw a negative inference from a defendant’s prior arrest, how 
will the same jury refrain from drawing a negative inference from the current 
arrest as the presumption of innocence requires?  We can confidently predict 
that jurors will not be able to follow the judge’s instructions that the current 
arrest is not evidence of guilt, but merely “the method by which the case came 
to trial.”64  Another troubling aspect of allowing prior arrests into evidence is 
that this practice will impact non-white defendants more than Caucasians, 
particularly young men.65  Prior arrests are generally not admissible evidence 
in any context other than rebutting good character.66  Even if a defendant is 
impeached with his criminal record when he takes the stand, he may only be 
impeached with an actual conviction, not solely with an arrest.67  Cross-
examination on arrests is a costly tax on a defendant who brings in evidence of 
her good character. 
Nor is impeachment limited to arrests.  The inadmissibility of the question 
“when did you stop beating your wife?” is legendary, yet the law permits 
prosecutors to ask “did you know he beats his wife?” and “have you heard he 
beats his wife?” 
 
The prosecution may pursue the inquiry with contradictory witnesses to show that 
damaging rumors, whether or not well-grounded, were afloat—for it is not the man that 
he is, but the name that he has which is put in issue.68 
 
This was how the Supreme Court justified allowing the government to cross-
examine a defense witness about specific instances of bad conduct.  This is 
“[t]he price a defendant must pay for attempting to prove his good 
name . . . .”69  Clearly it is a high price indeed. 
                                                 
64. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). 
65. For example, black men comprise 35% of arrests for drug possession, and 53% are convicted of 
drug possession, although they constitute only 13% of all drug users.  See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Drugs 
& Race, at http://archive.aclu.org/issues/drugpolicy/DrugsRace.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2003).  See also 
Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Devastating Impact of the Justice System on the Status of African-American Males, 
23 CAP. U. L. REV. 23 (1994) (detailing the disproportionate investigation, arrest, charging and sentencing of 
African-American males). 
66. It is hornbook law that evidence of an arrest is not admissible.  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, 
EVIDENCE, supra note 23, § 4.15.  But see United States v. Gonzales, 328 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(holding officer’s testimony about his knowledge of defendant’s prior arrests was admissible because it was 
intrinsic to the story of the crime and how defendant ended up being arrested for the charged offense). 
67. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
68. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479 (1948). 
69. Id. 
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To understand how these rules manipulate the view of an accused’s 
character, consider a scenario where former President George Washington was 
charged with a crime of dishonesty when he was a young man.  His defense 
lawyer would be able to find many character witnesses, but they would only be 
permitted to attest to his general reputation for honesty and to his reputation as 
a law-abiding citizen.  The prosecution could cross-examine in the following 
manner:  “Were you aware that the defendant [George Washington] committed 
a destruction of property, violently hacking a tree with an ax, just for fun—yes 
or no?”70  No evidence would be allowed to paint this event as proof of the 
man’s honesty by exploring defendant’s forthright admission to his father.  
That would be considered extraneous information barred by the rules.  If 
George Washington’s reputation would have such a rough road, what chance 
have regular criminal defendants? 
                                                 
70. In jurisdictions that allow opinion testimony, the question would be:  “Would your opinion of 
Mr. Washington change if you were informed he committed a destruction of property, violently hacking a 
tree with an ax just for fun—yes or no?” 
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In the one case where the Supreme Court considered evidence of good 
character, they refused to ameliorate the rule allowing wide cross-examination 
by prosecutors once defendants opened the door with good character.  The 
justices appear irked at the idea that the defense can use propensity but not the 
prosecution.71  The attitude of the majority in Michelson can best be 
paraphrased as “we don’t like good character evidence and if the price is high 
enough, they won’t put it on.”  A far cry from good character evidence being 
“so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional 
proportions.”72  It is a tax upon the defendant who would try to take advantage 
of this right to present good character.73  This philosophy works; defense 
lawyers shy away from putting on character evidence, a thanks-but-no-thanks 
attitude towards this “right.” 
Jim McClosky of Centurion Ministries has freed thirty prisoners by 
proving their innocence.74  I asked him to think about the cases he has worked 
on where he was sure of the client’s innocence.  In all his years of trying to 
free the wrongly convicted, he only handled one case where a defense lawyer 
put on witnesses that testified to the defendant’s good character.  In that case, 
despite eleven witnesses testifying to the defendant’s good character, the 
defendant was still convicted. 
In England today, police vouch for criminal defendants with no record of 
convictions.  One English barrister cross-examines the police in this manner:  
“I put it to you.  The defendant has good moral character.  Isn’t that so?”75  
“That’s right,” the police officer answers.  What is meant is that the accused 
has no prior convictions.  The barrister is confident that the officer will answer 
                                                 
71. See Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476. 
72. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee’s notes. 
73. It is similar to the tax that judges routinely employ in allowing criminal convictions against a 
defendant if he testifies, a tax the rules allow.  See FED. R. EVID. 609. 
74. This was culled from a conversation with Jim McCloskey on June 12, 2003.  The ministry has 
been active for over twenty years.  Centurion Ministries, C.M. Staff, at 
http://www.centurionministries.org/aboutus.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2003). 
75. This interchange was supplied by a barrister who has practiced criminal law in London for over 
ten years. 
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in the affirmative where there is no record of convictions.  In contrast, no 
American trial lawyer would ask a police officer about the defendant’s 
character.  A friend of mine who has been practicing criminal law for fourteen 
years informed me she had never put on good character evidence.  “I am afraid 
they would just make it up,” she said, referring to what the police would tell 
the prosecutor about her client so that he could cross-examine the character 
witnesses. 
The penalty against the introduction of good character must be eliminated 
or at least reduced.  Like England, a person should be able to tell the jury that 
he has no criminal convictions without fear that allegations will be 
manufactured against him.  At the very least, bad accusations must be vetted 
first to make sure there is a strong possibility of their truth and then to assure 
that there is more proof than just an arrest.76  I propose an even simpler rule.  
The prosecution may introduce criminal records of convictions if good 
character testimony is submitted, as long as a judge finds that it tends to 
disprove the testimony of good character witnesses.  Or, if the matter was 
adjudicated in civil court, such as a settlement for sexual harassment claims, 
that would also be permitted.  All other bad character rebuttal should be off 
limits.77  Prosecutors would still be able to cross-examine the character witness 
to show bias or lack of knowledge, just as they would any other witness. 
 
C.  Bad Character as the Elephant in the Room 
 
                                                 
76. One possible way to make the process fairer is to limit the prosecution rebuttal to the type of 
evidence introduced.  Thus, if opinion evidence is introduced by defense, then prosecution may not offer 
specific acts.  If reputation is offered by the defense, prosecution may bring in witnesses who heard a 
different reputation.  The only problem with this is that it would open up the discovery process so that 
prosecutors might try to find people who hold the defendant in ill-repute.  Such evidence also opens the door 
to witnesses testifying negatively to curry favor and informants testifying falsely. 
 
77. A defendant could use the motion in limine process to determine if criminal convictions would be 
introduced as a tax upon his good character witnesses just as currently, motions in limine help defendants 
find out if criminal convictions will be introduced against them if they take the stand in their own defense.  
More complicated is the question of non-criminal behavior of the defendant.  As my colleague Mike Cassidy 
asked, what about allowing in impeachment with non-criminal conduct?  Once the accused introduces 
specific instances of good conduct, should not the prosecution be able to introduce specific instances of non-
criminal behavior tending to show bad character through cross-examination of defense witnesses?  This 
alternative proposal would be for criminal allegations to be off-limits if they do not result in convictions, but 
leave the door open for bad conduct that is not criminal.  This avoids many of the problems discussed above, 
but not all of them.  A sexual harassment allegation could be wrong and quite damaging to the juror’s view 
of the defendant, but the mechanism for proving or disproving the allegation takes time.  It is likely to turn 
into a trial-within-a-trial.  A better use of judicial resources would be to exclude everything that hasn’t been 
adjudicated or settled through the courts. 
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The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, 
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction. 
 —Justice Robert Jackson, U.S. Supreme Court78 
 
                                                 
78. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted). 
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“It is fundamental to American jurisprudence that ‘a defendant must be 
tried for what he did, not for who he is.’”79  This philosophy requires courts to 
bar evidence designed to show that the accused is a bad person or has the 
propensity to commit the crime charged.  For nearly three centuries of Anglo-
American history, propensity evidence was barred, at least in theory.80 
In fact, the prosecution has a decided advantage in the war to control 
images of the defendant’s character, for jury trials are now filled with evidence 
of defendants’ uncharged misconduct.  Non-prosecuted bad acts, while not 
admissible as “bad character” or “propensity to commit the crime charged,” are 
often admitted under other evidentiary rules.81  There are several exceptions to 
the general rule banning prior bad acts, and these exceptions have been 
expanding, the exceptions starting to swallow the rule itself.82  In the federal 
context, these exceptions are referred to as 404(b) evidence.  Bad acts are 
admitted to show intent, malice, or motive, and sometimes just to provide 
“context.”83 
                                                 
79. United States v. Fosky, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing to United States v. Myers, 550 
F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
80. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 (Tillers rev. 1983). 
81. Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) allows “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to show proof of 
“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  
82. Brauser, supra note 4, at 1583; Melilli, supra note 4, at 1548; Park, supra note 4, at 755. 
83. Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to show 
proof of “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”  See, e.g., United States v. Serang, 156 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 1998) (allowing evidence that a 
defendant previously arranged a sham marriage between his aunt and his alleged co-conspirator in order to 
give the jury “context” from which to infer that the co-conspirator must have been devoted to the defendant, 
and therefore would be willing to engage in arson with him). 
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In the past decades, federal courts have affirmed trial courts’ decisions to 
permit evidence of bad acts in thousands of cases.84  Here are some examples.  
In trying a man for allegedly assaulting two passengers in a car, a federal 
district court allowed evidence that two years earlier, the defendant had 
assaulted his girlfriend (who was not an alleged victim in the case) with a 
knife.85  In trying a police officer for use of excessive force during a drug 
investigation, prosecutors were allowed to introduce evidence that one year 
before, when working as a bouncer in a club, the defendant “pulled a chair out 
from under an exotic dancer,” threw her into a wall and choked her.86  A man 
                                                 
84. A Westlaw check found hundreds of federal cases from August 7, 2002 to August 7, 2003 where 
bad act evidence was challenged.  See Leach, supra note 4, at 825. 
85. United States v. Haukaas, 172 F.3d 542 (8th Cir. 1999) (allowing evidence of the prior assault to 
prove intent to harm, to rebut self-defense). 
86. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 580, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2001) (introducing character evidence to 
prove intent).  The Court justified the evidence by noting that both involved “people who failed to respect 
his authority.”  Id. at 585.  The similarity is that the dancer complained to the bouncer after he pulled the 
chair out from under her while in the current charge the man thought that defendant was not a police officer 
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charged with arson was shown to have committed another arson six weeks 
before, and the jury also learned that at another time he had stolen property 
and used the proceeds to purchase illegal drugs.87 
In a kidnapping case, it was shown that the defendant had sexually 
assaulted a woman in an unrelated episode eleven days before.88  In a murder 
trial, a judge allowed evidence that the defendant purportedly ordered the 
murder of someone else at an earlier time.89  In a bank robbery prosecution, the 
                                                                                                                 
so he refused to open the door to his truck when ordered to do so. 
87. United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117 (8th Cir. 1998) (allowing a prior arson because it was 
relevant to government’s claim that defendants went to the construction site on the night of a fatal fire to 
steal equipment to sell in order to buy drugs); see also Serang, 156 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 1998). 
88. United States v. Metre, 150 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that evidence of an earlier 
abduction and rape was sufficiently similar to the charged crime to be probative of defendant’s specific 
intent to sexually assault victim of charged crime).  Where the charge was violent interference with the 
enjoyment of a public facility based on race, a witness was allowed to testify that the defendant refused to 
accompany some friends on an outing because they were going with a woman of “mixed race.”  United 
States v. Woodlee, 136 F.3d 1399 (10th Cir. 1998).  There was also a well-publicized trial of two white men 
in Texas who dragged a man to his death, where the tattoos on their arms which indicated racism and 
violence were projected onto a screen and discussed by an expert.  See CNN, Racism to be Key Issue in 
Third Dragging Death Trial, at http://www.cnn.com/US/9910/26/dragging.death.01/ (last visited Nov. 25, 
2003). 
89. United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 1998) (including a limiting instruction that the 
jury not consider the first murder as proof of the defendant’s propensity to kill again, only to prove his intent 
and motive to murder again). 
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defendant’s girlfriend—who was not involved in the robbery—was permitted 
to testify that she was afraid of him.90 
                                                 
90. United States v. Harris, 165 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir. 1999) (considering evidence as relevant 
background information).  See also United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 2000) (detailing bank 
robbery prosecution where government may show defendant robbed a restaurant afterwards because second 
robbery “shared sufficient similarities, such as intent to obtain money to support heroin addiction”). 
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Drug distribution and conspiracy trials often include evidence of other 
drug purchases,91 and other bad acts, such as gun sales.92  Domestic violence 
trials also have included prior bad acts, for example, previous restraining order 
violations and the accused’s unfavorable impression of women.93  A 
defendant’s prior violent acts against a victim are now allowed in homicide 
prosecutions.94  Again, the theory is that these bad acts are not being offered to 
prove propensity or bad character, but for some other reason, such as identity, 
motive, intent, or modus operandi. 
There is one final safeguard to protect the notion that “a defendant must 
be tried for what he did, not for who he is.”  If the prejudicial aspect of a piece 
of evidence substantially outweighs the probative value, trial judges are 
supposed to exclude it.95  However, in all the cases described above, the 
evidence was not considered too prejudicial, even on appeal.  Apparently, 
many courts are not strictly applying the balancing rule to prevent bad 
character and propensity from being injected into the trial. 
                                                 
91. United States v. Best, 250 F.3d 1084 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting charge of possession of narcotics 
with intent to distribute, where the prosecutor was entitled to introduce conviction two years earlier of 
possession of drugs); United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing how drugs found in 
other state after conspiracy allegedly concluded); United States v. Brisk, 171 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(noting drugs found prior to conspiracy). 
92. One conspiracy case for drug and weapons possession allowed in evidence of uncharged 
murders.  United States v. Baptiste, 264 F. 3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing how it was “necessary for 
the jury to understand the brutal nature of the conspiracy”).  In a drug case, the court allowed in evidence 
that the accused sexually assaulted someone who allegedly helped him sell the drugs.  United States v. 
Johnson, 169 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing how rape was admissible to show means used 
to obtain payment for drug debt in furtherance of conspiracy).  See also United States v. Gibson, 170 F.3d 
673, 679 (7th Cir. 1999) (allowing incriminating statements defendant made to the FBI concerning illegal 
sale of weapon and defendant’s prior drug dealing activities). 
93. United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing how prosecutor also 
introduced the defendant’s belief that he was above the law to show propensity to lie). 
94. See FED. R. EVID. 413 (allowing evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases).  See, e.g., 
United States v. Frank, 11 F. Supp. 2d 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 
95. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence establishes a balancing test to exclude evidence that is 
more prejudicial than probative.  Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  FED. R. 
EVID. 403.  But see United States v. Claxton, 276 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting how rules allow 
evidence of other crimes unless “it tends to prove only criminal disposition”); United States v. Fallen, 256 F. 
3d 1082, 1091 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding “Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy, however, ‘which should be 
used only sparingly since it permits the trial court to exclude concededly probative evidence.  The balance 
under the Rule, therefore, should be struck in favor of admissibility.’”).  Russell Jones writes “it is a well 
accepted principle that the standard used to assess evidence under rule 403 will admit evidence more often 
than it will exclude it.”  Jones, supra note 4, at 20 (citing GLEN WEISSENBERGER, WEISSENBERGER’S 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE 403.2 (3d ed. 1997)). 
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State courts all have analogous rules to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 
allowing exceptions to the ban against propensity evidence.96  Some states 
have also expanded the amount of bad act evidence introduced.97 
                                                 
96. For example, in the O.J. Simpson homicide trial, prior bad acts were allowed in against the 
victim.  See, e.g., Nebraska v. Jones, 577 N.W.2d 302, 307-08 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998) (describing how 
defendant was charged with sexually assaulting two children, and how prosecutor was allowed to show 
another sexual assault on an unrelated child for purpose of proving motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, or 
identity); State v. Fritsch, 511 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (admitting evidence showing knowledge of 
degree of care expected towards a child in mother’s prosecution for child abuse and involuntary 
manslaughter), rev’d on other grounds, 526 S.E.2d 451 (N.C. 2000). 
97. See, e.g., Tom R. Mason, Navigating the Maze of Evidence of Character and Other Crimes, 
Wrongs or Acts, 71 MISS. L.J. 835, 880-81 (2002) (detailing Mississippi law which is more restrictive vis-á-
vis bad act evidence).  Nevertheless, he writes that “courts have been creative in finding other unlisted 
purposes [for] justifying evidence” of other bad acts.  Id. 
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Although they are not introduced to show that the accused is a bad person 
or has the propensity to commit the crime charged, once the bad acts are 
introduced the prosecution may find a way to use them in closing argument to 
create a picture of the defendant as someone capable of committing the 
crime.98 
Courts have long held the view that evidence introduced under the 404(b) 
exceptions do not constitute propensity or bad character evidence.  While 
recognizing the danger that jurors might use bad act evidence the wrong way, 
courts tend to assume that curative instructions will cure the problem.  There 
are two myths operating here:  first, that jury instructions will cure the 
tendency of juries to use previous criminal behavior as propensity evidence; 
second, that the “other” reason the prior bad acts were admitted is unrelated to 
propensity or bad character evidence. 
Professor Andrew Morris persuasively exploded the second myth, proving 
that evidence admitted to show “intent” or “identity” relies on a propensity 
inference in order to establish relevance.99  For this “other purpose” reasoning 
to work, one must assume a continuity of the defendant’s bad character.  
Consider a drug case where defendant is found with drugs concealed in his 
car’s gas tank, and the court admits a prior conviction for smuggling drugs in a 
vehicle.100  The evidence in that case was allowed in order to show knowledge, 
intent, and plan.  In other words, the jury is expected to infer that since he 
behaved badly once before in smuggling drugs, it is reasonable to conclude he 
will behave badly again.  The “bad act evidence supports the finding of intent 
only if one assumes that the character traits that can be inferred from the 
uncharged misconduct evidence are continuing.”101  It is targeted propensity 
                                                 
98. Samuel Gross, Make Believe:  The Rules Excluding Evidence of Character and Liability 
Insurance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 848-52 (1998). 
99. Morris, supra note 4, at 187 (noting “[w]ithout exception, all federal circuits (and all states) 
accept this division of the evidentiary field into air-tight propensity and non-propensity categories”).  For a 
list of scholars who accepted the logic that Rule 404 bans propensity reasoning, see id. at 184 n.13. 
100. United States v. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d 344, 349-50 (5th Cir. 2002). 
101. Morris, supra note 4, at 198-201.  “This is so because the bad act evidence supports the finding 
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rather than general bad character evidence, but because it is targeted, it is often 
more damaging than general bad character testimony.  As judges allow in 
growing quantities of evidence under 404(b), the ban against bad character is 
further undermined. 
                                                                                                                 
of intent only if one assumes that the character traits that can be inferred from the uncharged misconduct 
evidence are continuing.”  Id. at 201. 
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Judges often instruct juries that prior and subsequent bad acts are admitted 
for a limited purpose and not to show propensity or bad character.  Thus, in the 
drug case described above involving the prior conviction for smuggling drugs, 
the judge “properly instructed the jury that it was to consider Saucedo-
Munoz’s prior offense only so far as it demonstrated the requisite intent.”102  
According to the appeals court:  “This mitigated any danger that the jury 
considered the evidence improperly as proof of bad character.”103  These type 
of instructions are impossible to follow because, as Professor Morris explains, 
the prior offense only demonstrates the requisite intent if one assumes that the 
defendant has the continuing bad character to repeat the wrong deed.  No 
wonder jury instructions attempting to limit 404(b) evidence are so ineffectual; 
most contain an inherent contradiction. 
Some evidence does not fit Professor Morris’s bad character theory.  After 
all, Professor Morris’s thesis involved intent and identity evidence; he did not 
consider motive and other 404(b) exceptions.  But in those cases where 
evidence truly fits a non-propensity purpose, it is still difficult for the jury to 
disregard the bad character aspect of the bad act evidence.  For example, in a 
recent well-publicized Massachusetts murder trial of a Wellesley doctor 
accused of killing his wife, the prosecution introduced evidence that the doctor 
often cruised the Internet for pornography and sex.104  This dirt was allowed 
                                                 
102. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d at 350. 
103. Id. 
104. MacDaniel, Greineder Guilty of Murder:  Doctor Gets Life Term, No Parole, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 30, 2001, at A1.  Dr. Dirk Greineder had all the superficial trappings of good character, including a 
house in Wellesley and a teaching position at Harvard Medical School.  Id.  You could even say he had good 
character witnesses since his three grown children testified in his favor.  “Attorneys agreed that Greineder’s 
best case was made by the testimony and courtroom presence of his three grown children, all well-educated 
and convinced of their father’s innocence.”  Erica Noonan, In the End, DNA Evidence Outweighed Defense, 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 2001, at B6.  His conviction for first-degree murder of his wife may be understood 
as one where the prosecution was able to off-set the good character testimony with bad character evidence.  
Id. 
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into evidence to show motive, for allegedly his wife had just found out about 
his secret.  This is a classic example of motive evidence, relevant because it 
helps to explain why and when the defendant may have decided to kill, but 
regardless of jury instructions to the contrary, the evidence doubles as 
character assassination.  The jury learned that the day after the murder, 
Dr. Greineder attempted to hire a prostitute.  It would take an unusual juror not 
to view this piece of evidence as reflecting negatively on the doctor’s 
character. 
There is general skepticism among defense attorneys and scholars that 
juries can disregard the bad character aspect of bad acts, once bad acts of the 
defendant are introduced against the accused for any reason, regardless of 
whether a judge gives limiting instructions.105  Judge Learned Hand described 
limiting instructions as “the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic 
which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody’s else.”106  Telling jurors 
to disregard what they have heard during a trial has been likened to telling 
them to ignore the white elephant in the corner of the room.  It is even harder 
for jurors to follow instructions such as the one in Saucedo-Munoz’s case,107 
where the jury is told that the defendant’s prior transportation of drugs may be 
used to determine if, in the current case, defendant knew the drugs were in his 
car and intended to smuggle them, but not to prove that he had the propensity 
to smuggle drugs.  Imagine a jury instructed that they may consider former 
physical abuse as proof of the defendant’s general pattern of behavior but not 
to show his propensity to beat his wife.  It is like telling a jury they can 
examine the elephant in the room, and consider its weight, but they may not 
                                                 
105. One study noted that “ninety-eight percent of lawyers believed jurors are not able to follow 
instructions to consider prior conviction evidence only for impeachment purposes.” Dodson, supra note 4, at 
43.  The article details studies that prove that jurors convict more often when given a defendant’s prior 
convictions and do not follow limiting instructions.  Id.  See also Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the 
Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence:  Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 173-87 (1989); 
Melilli, supra note 4, at 1549. 
Judge Frank wrote that limiting instructions “are like exorcising phrases intended to drive out evil 
spirits.”  JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 184 (1930).  Another commentator wrote that by 
using limiting instructions, the courts are sometimes treating juries “as a group of low-grade morons” and at 
other times as people “endowed with a superhuman ability to control their emotions and intellects.”  
EDMUND M. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 
105 (1956).  Some label limiting instructions as useless because “it is impossible for the juror to so order his 
mind as to enable him to fractionate evidence into competent and incompetent segments, using only the 
former in his decisionmaking process.”  Note, The Limiting Instruction—Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 
MINN. L. REV. 264, 267 (1966) (citing numerous judicial opinions). 
106. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932). 
 
107. United States v. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d 344, 347-50 (5th Cir. 2002); see also supra notes 
100-03 and accompanying text. 
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consider its size.  Prior bad acts often operate as bad character evidence, and of 
the most persuasive kind. 
One far-reaching reform would be to exclude “intent” from the list of 
404(b) exceptions.  As Professor Morris established, “intent” is just a 
camouflaged propensity argument.108  Similarly, “identity” might be removed 
from the list for the same reason.  Another proposal for reform I make is to 
limit other 404(b) evidence to situations where the argument for its 
admissibility does not rely on propensity assumptions.  Judges would need to 
become versed in the logic set forth in Professor Morris’s article and perform a 
gate-keeping function.  Other than “motive” evidence, this reform would 
restrict a good deal of prior bad acts currently coursing through criminal cases. 
                                                 
108. Morris, supra note 4, at 190-96. 
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Another way that prior bad acts are introduced into criminal trials is as a 
tax on a defendant who takes the stand.  Defendants who testify may be 
impeached by prior convictions ostensibly to help jurors evaluate their 
credibility.109  In that area there is also pretense that instructions will prevent 
jurors from using these prior convictions as propensity evidence or bad 
character.  Commentators have long recognized the fact that jurors use prior 
convictions for propensity and bad character purposes.110 
Uncharged bad conduct has been a growth industry.111  There are more 
appellate cases involving bad acts than any other area of evidence.112  In 1994, 
Congress amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to specifically allow bad 
character evidence to be introduced in select cases.113  There is discussion 
                                                 
109. Impeachment by prior conviction is the norm in federal court and in most state courts.  See 
Dodson, supra note 4, at 31. 
110. Jurors are only supposed to use the convictions to evaluate the defendant’s credibility, not 
whether or not they are more likely to have committed the crime.  Id. 
111. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (1984). 
112. 22 CHARLES WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 5239, at 427 
(1978).  Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is also the most cited rule of evidence.  FED. R. EVID. 
404 advisory committee’s notes to the 1991 amendment. 
113. FED. R. EVID. 413-415.  These rules expand bad character for sexual assault trials, allowing 
evidence of another offense of sexual assault, with or without a conviction.  Andrew E. Taslitz writes that 
these rules were adopted hastily and radically change the historic bar on character evidence.  “Of 
considerable concern is the fact that [the new rule] ignores the empirical data, which require a wider range of 
behavior than a single prior incident of wrongful conduct, and a closer match between the earlier situations 
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about doing away with the bad character ban in all cases to prove 
propensity.114  In 2002, Congress further amended the Rules of Evidence to 
allow the state to try to prove that the defendant has a bad character trait, such 
as a violent nature, once the defense introduces evidence that the victim 
possesses this bad character trait.115  In other words, the defendant no longer 
needs to introduce his own good character in order to open the door to bad 
character.  This growing trend towards bad character evidence has not been 
matched by any equivalent movement to expand good character evidence. 
The paradox is that character law is presently taught as if the rules of 
evidence are asymmetrical in favor of the defense.  It appears that the lawyer 
for the accused may argue that she lacks the propensity to do the crime while 
the prosecution is prohibited from offering evidence to prove that the 
defendant is the type of person who would commit such a crime.  It seems as 
though criminals are privileged at the expense of the state or of victims.  In 
reality, this asymmetry is reversed. 
In sum, defendants in some jurisdictions may only introduce reputation 
testimony.  These witnesses may only generalize from what other people told 
them about their opinion of the defendant’s character, testimony so labored 
and weak that juries could hardly give it much weight.  In other instances, 
courts bar evidence of good character altogether, claiming that the crimes 
charged do not involve moral turpitude, so evidence of good character is 
irrelevant.  Moreover, disincentives are worked into the rules of evidence, so 
that the small benefits achieved by presenting good character witnesses are 
generally offset by the danger posed by cross-examination of these witnesses.  
Thus, this right is subject to such limitation that it is practically meaningless. 
                                                                                                                 
and the present one, for prior [bad] acts to be predictive of current ones.”  Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal 
Stories I:  Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 387, 495 
(1996) [hereinafter Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories].  Several states have followed suit, adopting similar 
exceptions to the character ban.  See Jones, supra note 4, at 20. 
114. See Leach, supra note 4, at 825. 
115. See FED R. EVID. 404(a)(1) advisory committee’s notes (“the amendment is designed to permit a 
more balanced presentation of character evidence when an accused chooses to attack the character of the 
alleged victim”). 
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Good character evidence is like the children’s party game where the big 
present is but a tiny trinket wrapped within multiple layers of boxes and 
wrapping paper.  In contrast, the prosecution’s package appears smaller, but is 
filled with ammunition.  The current rules of good and bad character are not 
equal for prosecution and defense, but the inequality slants in favor of the 
prosecution.  Other scholars have called for an end to back-door bad character 
evidence, and the paltry state of good character evidence supports this call.116  
Certainly the best way to go back to the promise that a defendant will only be 
tried for what he did or did not do on the night in question, rather than for 
leading an immoral life, is to do away with prior bad acts except in the 
slimmest possible exceptions. 
Rule 404(b) should be amended to exclude identity and intent as 
categories.  As for other Rule 404(b) exceptions, judges should be required to 
determine if there is a non-propensity purpose in addition to performing the 
balancing function, and omit that evidence which relies on propensity 
reasoning for its admissibility. 
 
III.  HOW JURIES REALLY DECIDE CHARACTER 
 
 
Next we must consider good character evidence in its own right.  Quite 
apart from the expansion of bad character, is there an injustice in disallowing 
all but the weakest good character evidence?  To answer that question, we 
must look at how jurors currently evaluate character. 
                                                 
116. See supra note 4. 
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It appears from the Rules of Evidence that the defense chooses whether or 
not character is injected into a trial,117 but in fact, character is central to all jury 
trials.  Lawyers understand that courtroom drama is about convincing a jury to 
view the personalities involved in the action in such a way that benefits their 
side.  Prosecutors do the same with their alleged victims:  ask them to dress 
well, sit with their families in the front row, and consciously relate to them in a 
manner that signals to the jury the prosecutor’s belief in their integrity.  From 
opening statement through closing arguments, jury trials are full of references 
to character and character motivation.  As Samuel Gross notes, the trial lawyer 
attempts to create a story much the same way as a novelist does, and the one 
who succeeds in authoring the story the jury believes, “carries the day.”118 
Professor Andrew Taslitz has looked at empirical studies to prove that 
jurors use narrative and story telling to make decisions.119  Empirical studies 
support the idea that juries reason by telling stories.120  As Professor Taslitz 
writes, human “need for stories is hardwired into our brains.”121  He cites a 
study of jury deliberations where jurors filled in gaps in mental states of the 
                                                 
117. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a); see infra Section III. 
118. Gross, supra note 98, at 853.  See also Peter Tillers, What Is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 
49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 812 (1998) (“In short, American trial lawyers have been exploring and discussing 
human character in their closing arguments for many years.”). 
119. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 113, at 436-39. 
120. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE 
JUROR:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 194-95 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) [hereinafter 
Pennington & Hastie]; see also NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE:  JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE 
LAW 62-78 (1995) (citing W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM:  JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981), for their experiments in showing 
that narrative thinking rather than propositional thinking describes the way jurors make decisions). 
121. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 113, at 434. 
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participants based upon inferences.122  Almost half of the references during the 
deliberations were references to inferred events, actions, mental states and 
goals that turned the trial into coherent stories.  Much of story telling focuses 
on character.  Stories turn on what the characters want and how they act to 
achieve their objectives.123  Characters are labeled and then motives and 
actions attributed to the character are based upon the label.124  In the studies of 
mock trials, witnesses and defendants were labeled and then actions were 
attributed to that person based on the label.125 
                                                 
122. Id. at 435 (citing Pennington & Hastie, supra note 120, at 195). 
123. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 113, at 439-40. 
124. Id. at 437 n.335. 
125. Id. at 436-77. 
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This story model of jury deliberation supports the idea that good character 
evidence could affect jury deliberations if the rules were changed.  Assuming 
that jurors do reason in terms of stories, the most persuasive evidence of good 
character would be vignettes from the life of the accused.  Stories of the 
accused saving the life of a drowning man or stories of the accused helping her 
children with homework would carry meaning.  In contrast, reputation 
evidence that “Ms. X has a reputation for good moral character” sounds like a 
form letter for an application to the Bar.  It falls outside narrative reasoning.  
Moreover, the studies’ most striking implication is that if truth is not provided, 
the jury will rely on inferences and labels.126  These labels do not provide 
individualized justice.  Instead, the labels are prone to cultural bias. 
Defense lawyers have a particular burden regarding the way juries see 
their clients.  One of their chief missions is to humanize them in the eyes of the 
jury.  To some jurors, the mere fact that a person has been charged with a 
crime will make them assume that the defendant is different from them, a bad 
person, a criminal.127  By finding ways to humanize their clients, defense 
lawyers try to offset the imbalance caused by the accusation and by public 
                                                 
126. See also NORMAN T. FEATHER, VALUES, ACHIEVEMENT, AND JUSTICE:  STUDIES IN THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF DESERVINGNESS (1999).  Feather, an Australian psychologist writes that “the study of 
moral character has been relatively neglected in both social psychology and personality research.”  Id. at 
222.  He did studies that showed that simulated jurors made links between moral worth and status, and 
showed that status acted as a shield to protect the offender in certain situations.  Id. at 222-31. 
127. See Adele Bernhard, Effective Assistance of Counsel, in RICHARD A. LEO, FALSE CONFESSIONS:  
CAUSE, CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS IN WRONGLY CONVICTED:  PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 
213-33 (Saundra D. Westervet & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (discussing the “unacknowledged but 
pervasive belief that all participants in the criminal justice system—even defense attorneys—that anyone 
who has been arrested is guilty”). 
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approbation towards criminal defendants.128  Character evidence must be 
understood in this light. 
 
A.  Humanizing the Accused 
 
 
Defense lawyers put character witnesses on the stand primarily to 
humanize the accused.  It is always easier for a jury to convict someone they 
do not empathize with, than one they do.  If the government is able to portray 
the accused as “the other,” not someone like themselves, the chances of 
conviction soar.129 
                                                 
128. Certainly, this is something I did in my own practice.  Also, in conversations with other lawyers 
about their cases, I observed attorneys to be very aware of how their client was likely to be perceived by the 
jury. 
129. See Johnson, infra note 146, at 182. 
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Most of what lawyers do to humanize their client does not fall under the 
rubric of “good character evidence.”  Just as prosecutors know that evidence of 
defendant’s prior bad behavior introduced under some exception to the rule 
still serves as bad character evidence for the jury, defense lawyers think of 
ways to humanize their clients regardless of whether this evidence counts as 
good character evidence or not.  One basic example is how defense lawyers 
purposely communicate with their clients in front of the jury in such a way as 
to humanize them, so the jury will see the “defendant” as a real person, a 
thinking person, perhaps a likable person.130  For those who are troubled by a 
lawyer pretending to like a client he does not, consider the alternative; would 
we want a system where people would be more likely to be convicted if their 
lawyer did not like them?  In deciding whether the rules of good character are 
too limited, we must first understand the other tools at the defense counsel’s 
disposal and whether those tools suffice. 
Defense lawyers attempt to put the character of the accused before the 
jury through other methods, such as through the defendant herself or through 
percipient witnesses in a manner not technically considered good character 
evidence.  For example, the defense lawyer may think of ways to bring out the 
fact that the accused has a job, education, or a family.  Perhaps where the 
accused has talked to the police, defense counsel might bring out that the 
accused has never been arrested or questioned by police officers before; the 
jury learns of the defendant’s clean record, ostensibly to help them evaluate 
the coercive nature of the interrogation.  If the accused testifies, the defense 
lawyer will try to phrase the questions and answers in such a way so as to 
highlight the best qualities of the accused without bringing up “good 
character.”  Some defendants, by sheer force of their personality, are able to 
convince a jury of their integrity and character through direct examination and 
by withstanding hostile cross-examination.131 
Humanizing the accused can sometimes be accomplished without 
introducing character evidence in cases where percipient witnesses know the 
                                                 
130. For example, when I prepare my students for trial, we discuss what the client will wear, what he 
will be doing at counsel table, and which student will be making sure the client is perceived as part of the 
team. 
131. In one case I tried, the jury came back with a not guilty verdict in five minutes despite the client 
having signed a confession.  She was a thoroughly convincing witness. 
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defendant.  For example, two students of mine in the clinic tried a case where 
the defendant’s wife testified he had eaten dinner with her one hour before he 
was arrested for drunken driving.  While she was ostensibly called only to say 
that he had not had anything to drink at dinner, her testimony was much more 
important than that.  She came across as honest, someone who refused to 
pretend that he was there minutes before, and yet it was clear that she believed 
he was innocent, that she cared for him and that she stood by him.  The 
underlying message was more important than the factual information given.  
Although not considered as such, she served as a character witness. 
However, the resourcefulness of defense attorneys should not be an 
excuse to block expansion of character evidence.  There are often no percipient 
witnesses to an event or non-event, nor do all innocent defendants perform 
well on the stand.  Many times, as dramatized in Snow Falling On Cedars, 
difference plays a role.  In many cases, the only method to set forth a 
defendant’s honesty, integrity or other personality trait is good character 
evidence, particularly if it were expanded to allow specific instances of 
generosity and honesty. 
 
B.  Using Libel and Slander Law to Understand a Criminal Accusation as 
Character Assassination 
 
 
As both prosecution and defense use what tools are available to them to 
create impressions about the defendant’s character and motivation, the 
prosecution has the decided advantage.  First and foremost is the fact that the 
prosecutor is accusing the defendant of a crime.  Even in cases where no other 
bad acts are introduced, the government is impugning the character of the 
defendant.  That is because the allegation itself, that the defendant did X, 
includes the corollary proposition that defendant has the character trait of 
someone who commits X crime.  This is true not only as a statement of logic, 
but more importantly, it is how jurors evaluate evidence.  Even if the 
prosecutor is not allowed to bring up the “bad character” of the accused in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith, as a practical matter, the 
accusation itself serves as a character assassination. 
Defense lawyers experience first hand the effect of the accusation itself on 
the jury.  In his opening statement, the prosecuting attorney informs the jury 
that the accused is a criminal.  Through his words and demeanor, the 
government lawyer convinces the jury that he knows this to be true.  
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Accusations alone carry a great deal of weight and power.  If there can be any 
doubt of the power of an accusation, even a false allegation, consider libel law. 
Laws regulating libel and slander recognize that calling someone a 
criminal damages that person’s reputation.132  Accusing someone of criminal 
behavior is libel per se, meaning that the harm to the person accused is so 
obvious it need not be proven.133  Consider the Tawana Brawley affair.  False 
allegations were made that an assistant district attorney named Steven Pagones 
kidnapped and raped a fifteen-year-old girl.  No charges were ever brought 
against him, and a grand jury cleared him.  Nevertheless he successfully sued 
for defamation against the alleged victim and her three advisors.134 
Richard Jewell was another recent case involving a false allegation.  
Mr. Jewell was the security guard named as a suspect in the bomb blast at the 
1996 Atlanta Olympics.  He went from the status of hero, for moving people 
away from a suspicious briefcase before it exploded, to suspect in three 
days.135  Like Steven Pagones, Richard Jewell was never charged and was 
publicly cleared.  Unlike Mr. Pagones, the insinuation against Mr. Jewell 
appeared to have governmental backing since the sources of the allegation 
were unidentified FBI officials who were said to be “close to making the 
case.”136  NBC, who reported that Jewell was a suspect, paid him over 
$500,000 to prevent an action for libel.137 
If incorrect accusations of criminal behavior destroy reputation when 
uttered by anyone, think how much more powerful an accusation by a 
                                                 
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. d. (1977). 
133. Id. 
134. The three advisors were Al Sharpton, C. Vernon Mason and Alton Maddox.  (This is the same Al 
Sharpton who is running in the 2004 presidential campaign).  The jury awarded damages against the advisors 
in the amount of $345,000, damages that could have been higher, legal commentators note, had the lawyer 
itemized the damages.  Court Decisions Second Judicial Department Dutchess County Supreme Court, 
Pagones v. Maddox, QDS:04700356, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 16, 1998, at 35.  Instead, some jurors said they took 
their cue from Mr. Pagones when he testified that “he did not want to destroy” the three men.  Joseph Kelner 
& Robert S. Kelner, Post-Trial Critique of Tawana Brawley Case, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 25, 1998, at 3.  Further 
damages were awarded by the judge against Ms. Brawley in the amount of $185,000.  This includes 
compensatory and punitive damages.  Supra at 35. 
135. Ex-Suspect in Bombing Sues Newspapers, College:  Jewell’s Libel Claim Seeks Unspecified 
Damages (AP story), WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1997, at A8. 
136. Amy Stevens, The Accused:  How Richard Jewell and His Lawyers Seek Revenge in the Media, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1997, at A1.  Mr. Brokaw, anchor of the NBC Nightly News, said on the air:  “The 
speculation is that the FBI is close to making the case, in their language.  They probably have enough to 
arrest him right now, probably enough to prosecute him, but you always want to have enough to convict him 
as well.  There are still some holes in this case.”  Id. at A4. 
 
137. Id.  He also reached monetary settlements with CNN, an Atlanta radio station, and with his 
former employer.  Jewell Settles Lawsuit with Former Employer, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1997, at A11. 
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government lawyer is, especially when the accusation is accompanied by a 
complaint or indictment.138 
                                                 
138. See Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
1297, 1299-1307 (2000) (discussing the burdens of the charge that persist even if the defendant is acquitted, 
especially the stigma on a defendant’s reputation). 
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Jurors are drawn from the public at large and reflect the dominant 
attitudes.  Many jurors assume that most defendants are guilty, or else they 
would not be there.139  They assume that there is a weeding out process that 
protects the innocent.140  They assume that the prosecuting attorney knows 
more than they know.  Thus, the accusation of criminal wrongdoing, which 
would be likely to destroy one’s reputation if uttered anywhere, is particularly 
damaging when uttered by someone recognized to be an officer of the court, 
with the full backing of the court behind him.  Given the existing juror 
attitudes, the accusation itself is character assassination.  As Professor Miguel 
Méndez writes, “these days . . . criminal defendants have replaced the 
Communists as the principal bogeymen.”141 
                                                 
139. See Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions:  Do We Really Acquit the 
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1372-74 (1997); William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 
WASH. L. REV. 329, 371-74 (1995). 
140. Givelber, supra note 139, at 1372 n.213 (“The state’s decision to charge the defendant with the 
crime has considerable evidentiary weight regardless of the presumption of innocence or any other 
platitude.”).  The fact that people are refused employment simply for being arrested attests to the 
presumption of guilt.  Id.  See Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 
SOC. PROB. 133, 134-38 (1962) (discussed in Leipold, supra note 138, at 1310 n.40).  Most cases involve 
police investigation followed by an arrest, and jurors learn of this in the course of trial.  There is a grand jury 
process in bringing the indictment which is often common knowledge even if not specifically mentioned 
during the course of trial.  In some cases, pretrial publicity creates an even more severe problem regarding 
the assumption of guilt by jurors. 
141. Méndez, supra note 4, at 884. 
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Prosecutors almost always press their advantage by referring to the 
accused not by his name, but as “the defendant,” uttered sometimes with 
disdain, or perhaps in the right case, a sneer.  Many prosecutors point an 
accusing finger towards the accused in their opening or closing statements, as 
if the assistant district attorney himself were an identifying eyewitness.  In 
closing arguments, prosecutors have been known to engage in name-calling 
including “animal,” “mad dog,” “worm,” “leech,” “punk,” “cheap, scaly, slimy 
crook,” and “the vilest type of character known to humanity.”142  While 
appellate courts should overturn convictions when such obvious character 
assassination occurs, it is sobering to learn that this is not always the case.143  
The point is not that prosecutors sometimes cross the line, but in understanding 
that these lines exist on a continuum, where obvious illegitimate character 
assassination is sometimes different only in degree from legitimate argument. 
Not surprisingly, prosecutors are specifically exempt from libel law.  No 
matter how untrue, the accusation in and out of the courtroom is not subject to 
redress under federal civil rights laws as long as the prosecutor was not acting 
dishonestly or maliciously.144  As a society we isolate prosecutors from the 
rules of slander, for certainly to do their jobs properly, prosecutors must call 
some innocent men and women criminals.145  It is naive to think that the force 
of the accusation is easily offset by the judge informing the jury that the 
defendant is presumed innocent. 
The Rules of Evidence speak of good character evidence as if character is 
brought up for the first time in a case by the defense lawyer when he presents 
character witnesses as part of the defense case.  In reality, good character 
                                                 
142. Gross, supra note 98, at 848-49. 
143. Trial court rulings are often affirmed in spite of prosecutors using derogatory language to 
describe the defendant.  See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 154 F. 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1907) (affirming 
despite prosecutor’s references to the defendant as a ‘hired gun fighter” and a “hired ruffian” because no 
error found); Illinois v. Franklin, 552 N.E.2d 743, 753 (Ill. 1990) (finding no error despite prosecutor’s 
references to the defendant as a “hit man” and an “executioner”); Tennessee v. Prince, 713 S.W.2d 914, 918 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (affirming despite prosecutors labeling of the defendant as a “dope peddler,” a 
“dope seller,” and a “dope dealer” in closing arguments); Williams v. Alabama, 377 So. 2d 634, 639 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1979) (affirming despite prosecutor’s calling the defendant a “wolf” and an “animal” in closing 
argument).  But see, e.g., Kincade v. Sparkman, 175 F.3d 444, 445-46 (6th Cir. 1999) (reversing conviction 
because of prejudice caused by the prosecutor repeatedly calling the defendant a professional burglar and 
insinuating that the defendant may have been involved in multiple burglaries throughout the county); 
Volkmor v. United States, 13 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1926) (reversing conviction because prosecutor 
prejudiced jury by referring to the defendant as a “skunk,” a “weak-faced weasel,” and a “cheap, scaly, slimy 
crook”). 
144. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977). 
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evidence is introduced in a more defensive posture.  Done well, good character 
witnesses will offset the character assassination caused by the accusation and 
undo the negative attitudes of some of the jurors at the commencement of the 
trial.  Such evidence constitutes an attempt to accord the accused the 
presumption of innocence the law promises. 
 
C.  Racial Difference Strengthens the Cost of the Accusation 
 
 
Although people charged with crimes constitute “the other” in the 
dominant American society, racial differences also matter.  If the accused is 
from a race which is unpopular, the prosecutor’s accusation is likely to have 
greater tenacity.  To the extent there has been research on the effect of jurors’ 
attitudes, the studies bear out the assumptions criminal lawyers have made for 
decades:  biases matter.  For example, researchers have documented that the 
race of the defendant affects how jurors view the accused and what kind of 
assumptions are made about them.146  “It would appear that white subjects tend 
to assume less favorable characteristics about black defendants than white 
defendants and that such assumptions contribute to these subjects’ greater 
tendency to find black defendants guilty,” concluded author Sheri Lynn 
Johnson in summarizing a number of studies measuring the correspondence 
between the race of defendants and juror attitudes.147  “When the evidence is 
not strong enough for conviction a white juror gives the benefit of the doubt to 
a white defendant but not to a black defendant.”148  Another study looked at 
juror sympathy as a factor in acquittal and concluded that white defendants 
were more likely to be recipients of juror leniency based on sympathy for the 
                                                 
146. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE 
CUTTING EDGE 180-90 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).  See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 4, at 18 (noting 
the “powerful pressures on individual jurors to resort to stereotyping for guidance”).  For online annotated 
bibliographies of readings on racial disparity in the criminal justice system, see Steven Kalogeras, Annotated 
Bibliography:  Racial Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System, at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/5007.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2003); Marc Mauer, Part I.  
Americans Behind Bars:  The International Use of Incarceration, 1992-93, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 
(1994), at http://www.drugpolicy.org/library/behindbars.cfm (last visited Nov. 25, 2003); Marc Mauer, Part 
II.  Americans Behind Bars:  The International Use of Incarceration, 1992-93, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 
(1994), at http://www.drugpolicy.org/library/bars-p2.cfm (last visited Nov. 25, 2003).  See also BARRY 
SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 203-05 (2000). 
147. Johnson, supra note 146 at 187. 
 
148. Id. at 181 & n.31 (citing Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial Evidential Factors in Juror 
Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 139-40 (1979)). 
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defendant because jurors viewed the black defendant as “extremely 
unsympathetic.”149 
Storytelling theory helps us understand the bias.  Since jurors use stories 
in their reasoning, stories that are common to the jurors’ culture will have 
more resonance, more power.150  “So cultural tales lay a heavy hand on the 
scales of justice.”151  Given the inherent stereotyping within culture, this 
constitutes a detriment for criminal defendants, especially criminal defendants 
from unpopular groups.  This helps explain why cultural stereotypes can have 
so much force at trial. 
                                                 
149. Johnson, supra note 146, at 181 (citing to H. KALVIN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 217, 
343-44 (1966) (comparing judges’ view of the evidence to that of jurors.  The study would likely have 
produced even more radical results if minority judges were chosen for the study.  There is no reason to 
suppose that white judges are immune from the stereotyping prevalent in juries)). 
150. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 113, at 435. 
151. Id. 
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When the public thinks about criminals they see a dark face.  Consider the 
way doorbells are used in some city stores to keep criminals out.  Race is often 
used as a predictor of bad character.152  The buzzers are meant to keep the 
criminals out.  Race is used as a predictor of criminality.  Consider “driving 
while black” cases; stops and searches where police use race as a predictor of 
criminality.153  When O.J. Simpson was accused of murder, Time altered a 
photograph to give him a darker complexion than he has.154  Lani Guinier 
speaks of the rhetorical wink, the way in which politicians can avoid being 
considered racist because they never mention color; instead they talk about 
crime and the need for prisons when the public knows they are talking about 
race and class.155  Jurors come from the same society that produces the shop 
owners, police, the readers of Time, and the constituents mentioned above.  
The opening statement of the prosecutor is even more likely to stick when the 
face they see at counsel table is a dark one.  The tendency to think the 
                                                 
152. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-46 (1991).  Professor Williams 
gives an account of being excluded from Benetton’s one afternoon.  “I pressed my round brown face to the 
window and my finger to the buzzer, seeking admittance.”  Id. at 44.  See also Anne-Marie G. Harris, 
Shopping While Black:  Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 1-56 (2003).  See also BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE (United Artists 2002) (discussing television’s 
focus on the arrest of people of color and comparing the rarity of depicting arrests of white CEO’s for 
embezzlement). 
153. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:  Why “Driving While Black” 
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
425, 430 (1997) (discussing drug courier profiles). 
154. TIME, June 27, 1994 (cover); NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1994 (cover).  The manipulation became 
apparent when Newsweek placed an un-touched-up version of the mug shot on its cover that same week.  See 
also Kate Betts, The Man Who Makes The Pictures Perfect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2003, § 9, at 1. 
155. Lani Guinier, Clinton Spoke the Truth on Race, BALT. EVENING SUN, Oct. 20, 1993, at 25A. 
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defendant looks guilty will naturally be higher if the defendant fits a 
stereotype.  The likelihood of a jury giving a defendant the benefit of the 
doubt—the presumption of innocence—diminishes as the margin of difference 
increases.  One way to think about a jury trial is the government’s attempt to 
label the accused as “the other,” the ultimate outsider, a criminal.  Jurors find it 
easier to consider a defendant as “the other” if they do not share the same race 
or class. 
Stereotypes and bias are natural products of human perception.  “All 
humans tend to categorize in order to make sense of experience.”156  According 
to psychologists E. Tory Higgins and Gillian King, information gleaned from 
people is quickly encoded into categories, 
 
                                                 
156. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice:  Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice 
Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733 (1995) (citing Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 337 (1987). 
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about social groups (e.g., blacks, women, gays and lesbians), social roles and occupations 
(e.g., spouses, maids, police officers), traits and behaviors (e.g., hostile, crime-prone, 
patriotic, and intelligent), and social types (e.g., intellectual, social activists, and 
rednecks).  Once the behavior is assigned to one of these categories, it is stored in 
memory, from which it subsequently can be retrieved to make further inferences and 
predictions about the person.157 
 
Results of the studies on human processing, writes Professor Jody Armour, 
“carry enormous implications for judgments and evaluations” of behavior of 
people who are members of these groups.158  For example, people may 
unconsciously attribute hostile or violent behavior to black men.159  Thus, the 
racial aspect of cultural stories is particularly problematic for defendants from 
unpopular backgrounds. 
Stereotypes are especially pernicious when the stereotype fits the 
accusation.  Among whites, 22% believe blacks are more violent than 
whites.160  The stereotype that black men are violent is problematic when an 
African-American man is charged with an assault.  Similar stereotypes of 
violence are attached to masculine-looking women.  The stereotype of the 
Latin-American drug king-pin resonates all too well where the accused is 
Latino and the charges involve narcotics.  Professor Taslitz writes about 
prevailing stereotypes in current culture that resonate with juries in rape cases: 
 black men and Hispanics as bullies and rapists, and poor black women as 
“welfare queens” who breed children for cash, are lazy and oversexed.161  
                                                 
157. Id. at 750-51 (citing E. Tory Higgins & Gilliam King, Accessibility of Social Consequences of 
Individuals and Contextual Variability, in PERSONALITY, COGNITIVE, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 69, 71-72 
(Nancy Corton & John F. Kihlstrom eds., 1981). 
158. See id. 
159. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 113, at 466 (citing PAUL N. SNIDERMAR & THOMAS 
PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE 38-44, 51 (1993)). 
160. Id. at 466 n.521. 
161. Id. at 456-59 (citing to RICHARD D. RIEKE & RANDALL K. STUTMAN, COMMUNICATION IN 
LEGAL ADVOCACY 94-98 (1990)) [hereinafter RIEKE & STUTMAN].  Other studies about bias are discussed 
in Armour, supra note 156. 
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Unfair acquittals, not unfair convictions, are what concern Taslitz about jury 
stereotyping.  Taslitz is concerned with factually guilty defendants being 
acquitted; he searches for ways to prevent acquittals in rape cases where jury 
stereotypes about rape and about victims of rape conflict with the 
government’s evidence.162  Nevertheless, these racial images have currency for 
defendants of color regardless of whether they are factually guilty or innocent. 
                                                 
162. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 113. 
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One of the cases that Taslitz uses to discuss pernicious stereotypes is the 
Central Park jogger case where a white female investment banker was brutally 
attacked while jogging.  The case raises interesting issues about the limits of 
good character evidence.  Thirty-six non-white youths were convicted of 
raping her and the word “wilding” was born in the media.  While Taslitz 
acknowledges how public attitudes towards teenaged blacks and Hispanics 
made it easier to convict them, he assumed they were factually guilty.  A 
decade after the convictions, the world knows better.163  DNA tests revealed 
the Central Park jogger was raped by one individual.  We are all familiar with 
the narratives of a “wilding” pack of boys.  But what are the narratives of 
innocence that were missing from the trials and the media?  Hindsight 
indicates that either the confessions themselves should have been barred or, at 
the very least, jurors needed to learn more about the danger of false 
confessions through expert testimony.  Now that we know they were innocent, 
we also assume that there is some story of who they were that led them to 
confess falsely to the police.  Did the jury need to hear more from their family 
members about their character?  Or is this an example of a situation where 
good character evidence will not help.  If these boys were in fact intent on 
robbery, not rape, such a narrative of innocence would not have resonated 
well.  Giving defense counsel the tools to use character evidence does not 
mean there will be narratives of innocence in most cases. 
Much of the effort in eliminating pernicious stereotyping from juries has 
been centered on jury selection.  Courts have cracked down on use of 
peremptory challenges to eliminate minority jurors from sitting in judgment.164 
 Focusing exclusively on jury selection to cure racial bias is problematic for it 
assumes that diverse juries will not entertain invidious stereotypes.  The same 
study that reported negative white attitudes also examined blacks’ attitudes 
                                                 
163. Susan Saulny, Convictions and Charges Voided in ’89 Central Park Jogger Attack, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 2002, at A1. 
164. Lonnie J. Brown Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection:  Professional Misconduct, Not 
Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209-31 (2003); Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection 
in Criminal Cases:  A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945 (1998). 
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towards members of their own race.  In “every case” they found that blacks 
were “at least as likely, sometimes even more likely, than whites to accept 
negative stereotypes about blacks.”165  Given these numbers, it seems 
important to seek additional ways to counteract prejudice against the accused 
rather than simply limiting or prohibiting peremptory challenges. 
                                                 
165. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 113, at 466.  But see REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, 
RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 138 (2001) (discussing how African-American citizens 
reacted differently than European Americans to the O.J. Simpson verdict based on the experiences of 
themselves and family of unfair police treatment). 
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How can character evidence help cross this great divide?  As a public 
defender I once handled a rape case where the accused was a black man and 
the alleged victim was a white woman in a long-term relationship with a white 
man.  Given the attitudes I saw around me in central Massachusetts, I assumed 
race was going to be a factor in the jury’s deliberations.  The accused was a 
soldier, and I spent a few days meeting with other soldiers, both black and 
white, who knew my client and would testify to his good character.  Under the 
Massachusetts character rules, they would not be allowed to testify to anything 
more than knowing the accused and the fact that he had a reputation for 
truthfulness and for upstanding character.  Nevertheless, I thought they would 
dilute the racism directed towards the accused.  After all, some of these 
soldiers were white young men, men like the jurors’ own sons, who would tell 
the jury that this was a normal man, not some crazy rapist.166  But this case is 
just an example of the defense using stereotyping too.  My client crossed over 
the division from “the other” because he was a soldier in an integrated army, 
because he had white friends.  His friends were the cows and horses so 
enamored by the lawyer in Map of the World, superficial markers of 
belonging.  They are the white friend Patricia Williams could take shopping if 
she wants to better her chances of being buzzed into Benetton.167  But not all 
defendants have close friends from other races and classes.  Is it possible for 
witnesses from the same racial background as an outsider defendant to 
                                                 
166. Unfortunately, I never had a chance to see how my theory worked in practice.  I agreed to 
continue the case a number of times for it looked as if the alleged victim did not want to press forward with 
the case and the charges would be dropped.  When it finally did go to trial, I had left the public defender’s 
office and the soldiers I had put on my witness list had all moved out of state.  My client was acquitted 
thanks to some wonderful lawyering of a colleague of mine, but not until the jury was out for five hours.  It 
was the exact type of case where character evidence could make a difference. 
167. WILLIAMS, supra note 152. 
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translate the humanity of a moral defendant effectively for a white jury?168  If 
we expand the right of good character evidence, are we only going to benefit 
those who are already advantaged under the present system? 
                                                 
168. In a recent article, Thomas J. Reed wrote “Martinez is the only case since the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in which the defendant was acquitted on account of good character standing by 
itself.”  Reed, supra note 4, at 3521 (citing United States v. Martinez, 924 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Or. 1996), 
aff’d, 122 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1997)).  Since it is impossible to know through regular research methods what 
causes jurors to acquit, I suppose that what Reed meant was that Martinez is the only case where a trial judge 
overturned the jury’s conviction based on good character evidence presented.  See id. at 351 n.55. 
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Although lawyers might wish for middle-class white character witnesses, 
it is not always problematic to have witnesses from the same background as a 
minority defendant.  One way character evidence sometimes works to alleviate 
prejudice is when the jury connects with a character witness from the same 
background as the defendant.  For example, I tried a case where the all-white 
jury looked scared of the defendant and his alibi witness, both of whom were 
African-American teenagers.  The alibi witness wore baggy trousers, a 
headscarf, and had a rolling walk.  Some of the jurors shrank back as he 
walked by.169  However, when I put him on the stand, I could see the jurors 
gradually change their attitudes.  He was a sweet young man with an equally 
sweet young voice.  The evaporation of bias regarding the witness’s character 
could only have a salutary effect in dissipating the jury’s attitude about my 
client’s character, since he was from the same background.  In that case, the 
defendant’s mother also made a wonderful witness and further humanized my 
client.  Again, these were not character witnesses, but percipient witnesses.  
Nevertheless, they served a dual function; they were character witnesses in the 
sense that they helped humanize my client, helped undue stereotypes about 
African-American youth, and may even have given the accused the 
presumption of innocence.170 
Not all minority clients are lucky enough to have alibis or percipient 
witnesses who can double as de facto character witnesses.  Expanding good 
character evidence gives defense attorneys the opportunity to put on witnesses 
like my client’s mother and friends, even where there is no alibi defense.  
                                                 
169. I displayed him to the jury for identification purposes while cross-examining a police officer.  In 
fact, I asked the witness to dress the way he did for trial because that was the way he dressed in a store 
camera video the prosecution showed to the jury.  The clinic case discussed earlier in the article also 
involved an African-American defendant.  The witness that doubled as a de facto character witness, his wife, 
was also African-American. 
170. The defendant was acquitted but the defense practically proved innocence, so it is unclear 
whether the jury actually gave the defendant the presumption of innocence.  On the other hand, I felt the 
lessening of racial stereotyping helped make the verdict possible.  In that case, the witnesses probably served 
better than a psychologist in dissipating stereotypes. 
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Good character should not just be a lucky by-product of percipient witnesses’ 
testimony where it may dissipate stereotypes and bias in the jury room. 
Thus far, this article has focused on expanding lay testimony on character. 
 Expert testimony by psychologists also provide a good alternative method for 
presenting good character evidence.171  As long as experts base their opinion 
on life histories as well as personality tests, the psychologist may be the best 
type of witness to present the jury with a full picture of the accused.  Expert 
witnesses may indeed make the best translators from the culture of the client to 
the culture of the jury.172  Clients’ lives are often distasteful to juries:  unwed 
mothers and fathers, welfare checks, or friends who are in gangs.  These 
cultural differences make it difficult to find lay witnesses with whom the jury 
will identify.  Psychologists are likely to be from the same background as the 
jurors and may communicate the personality traits of the accused without 
interference from the cultural baggage of poverty.  In addition, psychologists 
may be able to explain behaviors of the group better than lay witnesses.173 
The choice should be left to defense counsel whether to rely solely on lay 
testimony or to seek psychological testing.  Attorneys may find experts make 
the defendant more of an outsider, a subject of study, rather than someone 
similar to the jurors’ sons, co-workers or neighbors.  Certainly, the cost of lay 
witnesses will be less expensive.  Defense attorneys may want to put on the 
friends and co-workers of the defendant instead of an expert or in conjunction 
with expert testimony.  Both methods of creating a human narrative should be 
available. 
 
IV.  THE EXPANSION OF GOOD CHARACTER EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT 
ENCOURAGE MORE BAD CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
 
 
                                                 
171. Professor Taslitz has laid out some of the advantages of expert testimony about a defendant’s 
personality in criminal trials.  Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 4, at 63-86.  See also Reed, supra note 4, at 
401 (advocating the acceptance of expert opinion evidence on personality traits). 
172. See Reed, supra note 4, at 401 (urging courts to accept expert opinion evidence on personality 
traits).  The problem posed by life histories is that it would seem to open the door to cross-examination on 
everything in that person’s life.  This is a problem of both time, money for proper investigation, as well as 
questions of accuracy.  Some limits would need to be imposed on the cross-examination. 
 
173. For example, if the defendant avoids eye contact with the lawyers at trial, it may be understood as 
evasiveness unless an expert explains the culture from which the defendant comes and the meaning 
associated with eye contact.  See Michelle S. Jacobs, People From the Footnotes:  The Missing Element in 
Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 358 (1997).  “Limited eye contact is 
culturally normative in African-American, . . . Latino, and Asian communities.” 
2003] REFORMING GOOD CHARACTER EVIDENCE 67 
  
 
                                                
“Connie will be a constant reminder for the jury that I’m not just some faceless 
defendant.  I’m not just some midwife.  I’m a mother.  I have a daughter, a family.” . . . . 
Nonny finally asked, “And that means they’ll have mercy?” 
“This is not about mercy!”  my mother snapped back. 
 Chris Bohjalian174 
 
 
174. CHRIS BOHJALIAN, MIDWIVES 236-37 (1998). 
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The rule permitting good character has been called the “mercy rule.”  The 
designation has some negative connotations, as if good character is not really 
evidence of innocence but a ploy for mercy or jury nullification.  Many 
observers believe the relevance of good character evidence is little or none.175  
Just because a criminal defendant appears well-meaning to his co-workers at 
the office does not mean he did not rape his date.  Just because a defendant has 
never committed a crime before does not mean that she did not commit one 
this time.  While this is true, relevance is an intentionally low standard, defined 
as any evidence that tends to make the existence of a particular fact at issue 
more or less likely.176  If any change in probability can be shown, then the 
proffered evidence meets the relevance test.177 
Social science data supports the notion that persons who act violently in 
the past are more likely to act violently in the future than those who have no 
prior history of violence, although this does not mean that violence can be 
predicted with any accuracy.178  Most evidence law is not based on science but 
on a common understanding of the world, and that includes the relevance 
standard.179  In everyday life, we look at people’s past behavior as predictors 
of future behavior and as aids to understand current behavior.  Although it is 
true that someone with no criminal history may commit her first crime, no one 
is saying that the lack of a criminal past is dispositive of whether she 
committed this crime.  Most evidence in criminal trials is not dispositive, but 
serves as just one building block—in this case a building block of innocence. 
DNA evidence has led to exonerations in many different types of cases, 
pointing to an over-conviction problem in the justice system.180  While most 
commentators seek solutions to the problem through limiting what the 
government may introduce, it is certainly important to use these revelations to 
                                                 
175. See, e.g., Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1227, 1305 (2001) (Sanchirico assumes that the mercy rule is only useful for those with impressive 
friends and who appear to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). 
176. See FED. R. EVID. 401. 
177. Id. 
178. MCCORMICK, supra note 36, at 793 & n.4 (“By and large, persons reputed to be violent commit 
more assaults than persons known to be peaceable.”). 
Studies reveal that the single best predictor of future violence is past violence. On the other hand, a 
1981 study showed that psychiatric experts were wrong in predicting future violent behavior in two out of 
three instances.  Méndez, supra note 4, at 876.  This article will not attempt to examine the psychological 
literature and social science literature in this regard.  See Reed, supra note 4, at 356 (summarizing 
personality theory in psychology). 
179. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The Ground Zero Theory of Evidence, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 321, 330 
(1998). 
180. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 146, at 262-67; Givelber, supra note 139, at 1318-19 & n.7. 
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consider the absence of defendant narratives at trial.  Generally this type of 
narrative—what Jeffrey Pokorak calls “The Human Story” which he contrasts 
to “The Kill Story”181—comes in at the sentencing phase rather than during the 
guilt/innocence phase.  Given what we know about jurors using story-telling 
models to fill in the gaps and decide the facts, the human story may well 
belong in the guilt/innocence phase also. 
One proposal this article makes is that the rules be changed to allow a 
wide variety of good character evidence and that admissibility not be limited to 
specific charges or specific traits.  The main benefit of good character evidence 
is that it strengthens the legal presumption of innocence and off-sets the 
slander-like damage of the charge.  Owing to juror bias, some defendants need 
to be humanized in order for the jury to give the defendant the presumption of 
innocence.  If the accused brings food every day to an elderly neighbor, that 
information helps humanize him in the eyes of the jury, whatever the charge is. 
 It may be difficult to explain what generosity has to do with being charged 
with car-jacking or a bar-room fight, but trying to fit people’s personality into 
specific pertinent traits proves too constricting and ignores the general 
defamatory nature of a criminal accusation.  I further recommend that good 
character evidence be expanded to allow specific instances of good conduct as 
well as opinion evidence. 
Expanding good character evidence takes valuable court time.  As with 
bad character evidence, there is a concern that the trial will get off course and 
the jurors subjected to extraneous information.  The jury may become 
sidetracked.  This problem may not seem to be very serious given the fact that 
the expansion of bad character evidence also takes time and judicial resources. 
 What is troubling for many about broadening the type and extent of good 
character testimony is that it may seem to take the fact finder farther away 
from the alleged crime than prior bad acts would. 
                                                 
181. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Dead Man Talking:  Competing Narratives and Effective Representation in 
Capital Cases, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 421, 434, 438 (1999). 
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“Ground zero” is the point at which the crime was committed or allegedly 
committed.182  Underwriting most evidence law is a bias that evidence in close 
proximity to the alleged crime is the most relevant and probative means to 
finding truth.183  Since character evidence is about how a person acts 
elsewhere, it is necessarily distant in time as well as in place.  That may make 
the evidence less convincing in some judges’ minds and perhaps judges’ also 
in the minds of many on the jury, but it does not make it irrelevant.  Moreover, 
while a focus on recency in trials serves to shorten them, it may not improve 
the truth-finding function as a wide-lens view would.  Usually the 
prosecution’s narrative focuses on the time the crime was committed or the 
time shortly before that.  It is only when the evidence is weak or susceptible of 
disbelief that the prosecution needs to delve into the past to gain convictions.  
But the defense narrative is bound to be different in many cases.  Under the 
defendant’s narrative of innocence in battered women defense cases, for 
example, there is a long history of abuse that needs to be explained.184  For a 
narrative of innocence centered on good character evidence, of course the focal 
point will be different from the day the crime happened.  The “ground zero” 
notion of relevancy is often a device that favors the prosecution’s case. 
Unfortunately, once commentators determine that character is relevant to 
decisionmaking, they often urge the use of prior bad act evidence.  To the 
extent scholars refer at all to good character, which is not often, they tend to 
discuss good and bad character evidence as if the two were interchangeable.185 
 This section explains why symmetry—although an improvement to the status 
quo—is not ideal for character evidence. 
There is a difference in the kind of dangers posed by the two forms of 
character evidence as well as the degree of harm.  The original asymmetry that 
was intended to favor the accused was unequal for a reason.  Asymmetry 
between good and bad character evidence has been justified historically by the 
danger of unfair prejudice to a defendant by character assassination with no 
equally countervailing danger from the admission of good character 
evidence.186  Consider the competing dangers in admitting character evidence 
                                                 
182. Term coined by Scheppele, supra note 179 (coining the term, “Ground zero” for crime scenes). 
183. See id. 
184. James J. Sing, Culture as Sameness:  Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in the 
Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845, 1866 (1999). 
185. See Reed, supra note 4, at 354-56. 
 
186. For the risk of unfair prejudice with the introduction of prior bad acts, see Huddleston v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).  See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 570 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) 
(suggesting in dissent that propensity evidence would violate the Due Process Clause of the federal 
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in a drug case.  The prosecution wants to put in the following propensity 
evidence: 
 
1. The accused sold drugs on prior occasions and therefore she probably was guilty this 
time.  (Or the defendant intended to sell drugs once before so probably intended to 
sell drugs again). 
 
The defense wants to put in the following lack of propensity evidence: 
 
2. The accused led a life that was full of integrity, compassion for the poor, hard work, 
and honesty from which they can infer she probably did not sell drugs. 
 
The first type of evidence creates a danger of prejudice that the jury will 
convict a defendant for what she did in the past rather than for the current 
charge.  It also creates a danger that the jury will relax its standard of proof.  
The jury will be less inclined to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt 
because she is not a good person so they do not care about her liberty interests 
in the same way as they would someone else.  These are grave dangers indeed, 
for they undercut the constitutional right that a defendant can only be 
convicted on proof that satisfies a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt as to 
the truth of a particular charge.  In contrast, good character evidence carries 
much less significant risks.  Not only is the danger of unfair prejudice 
nonexistent; in fact, good character evidence may mitigate other unfair 
prejudice in the trial. 
                                                                                                                 
Constitution). 
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McCormick explains that propensity evidence both for and against the 
accused is relevant, but bad propensity evidence is disallowed because it is 
considered much more prejudicial than is evidence in favor of the accused.187  
“Now, knowledge of the accused’s [good] character may prejudice the jury in 
his favor, but the magnitude of the prejudice or its social cost is thought to be 
less.”188  The previous rationale on relevance and prejudice continues to be 
convincing.  The long established purpose of excluding character evidence is 
to protect the presumption of innocence as well as to foster efficiency at trial 
by avoiding mini-trials on the uncharged conduct.189  Yet good character 
testimony only implicates efficiency, not prejudice against the accused.  The 
only comparable danger to undue prejudice in allowing in good character 
evidence is a concern that the evidence will increase the chances of jury 
nullification.  By jury nullification, I mean that there is fear that a factually 
guilty defendant will be set free because a jury likes him, or because they feel 
that since he has behaved admirably for so many years, the jury will feel it is 
unfair to convict him for one transgression. 
                                                 
187. MCCORMICK, supra note 36, at 812. 
188. Id. at 812-13. 
189. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 404[04] (1996). 
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To the extent character evidence increases the rate of acquittal, even if 
such acquittals are a form of jury nullification, it might be an improvement to 
the justice system.  Jury nullification already exists and is a recognized aspect 
of jury trials.190  The reason that the Constitution grants jury trials to criminal 
defendants is because juries are more likely to acquit.191  Jury nullification at 
its best serves as a clean up function for prosecutors that fail to properly screen 
their cases.192  Judges are under increasing pressure to allow the prosecution to 
make the decision whether to forge ahead or dismiss, while district attorneys 
sometimes have a no-drop policy, are politically pressured to continue cases, 
or simply pulled by the momentum of the case flow.193  Justice sometimes 
requires an acquittal.  When the public disagrees with a verdict of not guilty 
the verdict is often called jury nullification, but that does not mean it is a bad 
verdict. 
While we are uncomfortable with the jury nullification of white murders 
in the Reconstructionist South, most of us are comfortable with the acquittals 
in runaway slave cases.194  The recent controversy over jury nullification in 
favor of black defendants on account of race brought many of these issues to 
the forefront, including the fact that jury nullification as it is presently 
constituted tends to help white, middle class defendants, or those that look like 
the jury.195  One can also read the acquittal of murder for battered women who 
detail their abuse as a form of jury nullification.  Thus, if good character 
evidence does increase jury nullification, one question is whether it will 
                                                 
190. See David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited:  Why the Court Should Instruct the Jury of 
Its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89 (1995); see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:  
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995); see Andrew D. Leipold, The 
Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification:  A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1996). 
191. See Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of Proof 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt:  A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom About Excluding Defense Evidence, 
86 GEO. L.J. 621, 635 & n.105 (1998) (citing THE FEDERALIST PAPERS). 
192. Nullification may also reflect societal displeasure at the way laws are enforced.  See Butler, supra 
note 190, at 714. 
193. See generally Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 260 (1995).  For example, I represented an indigent client charged with disturbing the 
peace for yelling at the police while they sat on her brother, killing him by suffocation.  Even if she was 
technically disturbing the peace, I felt a jury should and would bring back a verdict of not guilty if the 
prosecution and judges failed to dismiss.  Taslitz writes that “criminal liability is justified primarily by moral 
values” and “the criminal law’s notions of responsibility in turn must be generally consistent with popular 
notions of morality.”  Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 4, at 20-21. 
194. See Butler, supra note 190, at 917-18. 
195. Id. at 692, 722 (pointing to the Rodney King acquittal). 
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increase the wrong kind of jury nullification— nullification that favors a two-
class system of justice in this country, or whether it is more benign.196 
                                                 
196. The problem is multi-faceted, for even if it serves to even the playing field for indigent minority 
defendants accused of crimes, it certainly does not help alleged victims who are indigent or minorities.  
Arguably, these changes might disempower them because if the defendant is from a privileged background 
and his character is built up, the perceived character of the alleged victim might suffer in comparison.  
Although this might be a problem, alleged victims also come to court with some inherent advantages that 
might off-set this uneven character battle, such as the advantage of having the government obtain a grand 
jury indictment based on their word. 
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Social science data indicates jurors are more influenced by unfavorable 
character evidence than they are by favorable character evidence.197  While 
juries are likely to consider good character in their deliberation, they are 
unlikely to overvalue this type of defense evidence. 
In a recent well-publicized case, a young English woman serving as a 
nanny was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of an infant in her 
care.  Louise Woodward’s defense team mounted a serious challenge to the 
scientific evidence introduced by the prosecution.  Woodward was convicted 
despite the fact that good character evidence was introduced in her favor.198  
The conviction squares with the social science data suggesting that juries are 
not unduly influenced by evidence of good character, at least not in the manner 
that it is presently introduced.  Woodward is also worth examining on the 
question of whether good character evidence is useful only for the middle class 
or wealthy defendants, the type of defendants that are already favored in the 
criminal justice system.  The English nanny had an expensive legal defense 
team and much of the public was sympathetic to her.  Some in the public were 
convinced of her innocence, but many more viewed her as a victim of 
situation.199  They had compassion for her and did not see her as a criminal.  
Woodward’s appeal to television viewers was her white skin and youth, and 
                                                 
197. See Michael Lupfer et al., Presenting Favorable and Unfavorable Character Evidence, 10 LAW 
& PSYCHOL. REV. 59 (1986).  Good character evidence comes into play in close cases.  There is no support 
for the proposition that jurors frequently disregard evidence of guilt just because a person is of good 
character. 
198. William F. Doherty, Pathologist Says Old Injuries Led to Death of Newton Infant, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1997, at A1 (“[T]wo teachers at Chashire schools that Woodward attended before coming 
to the United States . . . testified as character witnesses.  They described Woodward as nonviolent, law-
abiding, and honest.”). 
199. Nanny Goes Free; the Word on the Street:  Shock and Understanding, BOSTON HERALD, 
June 17, 1998, at 12; Letters to the Editor, Guilty of Being English, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1997, at A22. 
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the fact that she was English and female did not hurt her either.  Woodward’s 
conviction anecdotally supports the notion that for those with the attributes 
that substitute for good character in present day trials, the addition of good 
character testimony is largely redundant.200 
                                                 
200. Woodward was arguably a close case on the evidence, despite the fact that it involved the 
heinous charge of killing an infant.  The trial judge must have thought so, for he reduced the verdict on his 
own motion from second-degree murder to manslaughter.  William F. Doherty, Day of Decision:  The 
Woodward Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 11, 1997, at A1. 
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It should not be a disturbing notion that if one has led a blameless life up 
to the point of accusation, one should get the benefit of that personal history 
when the jury considers the evidence presented.  Moreover, if the jury is using 
good character evidence to favor acquittal in close cases, as the social science 
studies indicate, then that is a perfect use of this evidence.  Another way of 
looking at it is that the jury is taking to heart the constitutional mandates of 
presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Evidence that 
makes them scrupulously honor these oaths should be admitted without 
reservation.  In a recent article, Professor Katherine Goldwasser argued that 
whenever rules of evidence are used to restrict defense evidence, they should 
be challenged by the constitutional provisions mandating the presumption of 
innocence, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, and the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial.  These constitutional provisions designed to 
protect the criminal defendant need to be considered holistically, she argues 
quoting Justice Harlan, “bottomed on a fundamental value determination of 
our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent [person] than to let a 
guilty [person] go free.”201  Her arguments in favor of asymmetry within 
criminal trials should be imported into the arena of character evidence. 
In expanding good character testimony, it is imperative that no 
symmetrical loosening occur in the bad character rules.  Simply put, the force 
of bad act evidence is much more powerful than the force or affect of good act 
evidence.  Hence, if character were freely allowed in for both sides that would 
unduly privilege the government and unduly prejudice the defendant.  What 
about leveling the playing field by getting rid of all character evidence, both 
for and against the accused?  A friend who is a public defender commented 
“Good character?!  I would happily give up any right to good character 
evidence if in return I could keep out bad character.”  You find no dissenters to 
this opinion among the defense bar.  The data supports the proposition that we 
should trust jurors to sort out the reliability and strength of good character 
testimony.  It also supports the notion that the rules of evidence should not 
require symmetry between good and bad evidence but should treat each 
differently because they are different in fact, as measured by their impact on 
the jury’s decisionmaking.  While equal treatment of good and bad character 
evidence would appear to level the playing field—and might be an 
improvement for defendants in some courts and some cases—in fact equal 
treatment would privilege the prosecution.  If no evidence were allowed in 
                                                 
201. Goldwasser, supra note 191. 
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from either side, that would still favor the government because of the character 
assassination implicit in most indictments and opening statements. 
In sum, asymmetry in favor of good character evidence is justified by the 
significant danger of unfair prejudice nascent in bad character testimony.  
Neither concern posed by good character evidence—jury nullification and lack 
of recency—are comparable harms.  Harking back to the notion of the 
accusation itself as libel, there is no comparable need on the part of the 
prosecution to off-set the accusation.  The need for good character evidence is 
not counterbalanced by any similar need for bad character evidence, while the 
risk of harm from bad character evidence is much greater. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION:  REFORMS TO ASSURE THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
 
 
At present, the right of the accused to present his good character is a 
hollow promise.  A system where the story of George Washington chopping 
down a cherry tree is fodder for cross-examination but may not be used to 
show honesty, is a system that needs reform. 
The myth of asymmetry teaches law students that defendants have the 
right to prove their good character while the prosecution is prevented from 
bringing in bad character except in the most narrow of circumstances.  What 
goes on in courtrooms is quite different.  Reality is also asymmetrical, but it is 
prior good acts that are not presented, while prior bad acts are increasingly 
allowed in.  While most of this bad character evidence is ostensibly allowed in 
for a different purpose than propensity, in most instances jurors will use this 
evidence as proof of bad character.  The original reasons for curtailing bad 
character evidence are as valid as ever.  Prior bad acts entail a danger of unfair 
prejudice to the accused, the danger that jurors will not give a defendant the 
presumption of innocence on the current charge once they learn about 
defendant’s bad character.  In contrast, prior good acts pose no strong danger 
to justice.  The character rules should be reformed to reflect the original 
promise, an asymmetry that protects the accused.  Good character may be 
“deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence,”202 but it also should be imbedded in 
the practice of law. 
Lack of good character evidence in jury trials poses a myriad of problems 
for justice in this country.  First, there is the problem of hypocrisy, with the 
                                                 
202. See supra note 22. 
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promise of defendant rights taught but not practiced, enforcing the public myth 
about “coddled criminals”; a myth with negative side effects on the justice 
system in this country.  Second, there is the problem of wrongful convictions.  
The pervasive lack of good character evidence in wrongful conviction cases 
(as in all criminal cases) forces us to wonder whether good character evidence 
might have made a difference in some of these cases.  Although more studies 
are needed to ascertain whether good character evidence will prevent wrongful 
convictions, I have shown how such evidence serves to strengthen the 
presumption of innocence and how the lack of evidence enforces the 
presumption of guilt.  Third, there is the problem of the non-level playing field 
vis-à-vis the prosecution.  The prosecution’s allegation of wrongdoing is itself 
a burden on the jury’s view of the defendant’s character, and the prosecution’s 
use of prior bad acts is ever increasing.  In contrast, good character evidence, if 
allowed, would simply undergird the benefit of the doubt and presumption of 
innocence that are cornerstones of criminal jurisprudence.  Fourth, there is the 
problem of the non-level playing field vis-à-vis affluent, white defendants. 
Offsetting prejudice is probably the most important use of good character 
evidence.  Where the accused is from a socially unpopular group, accusations 
are even more likely to stick.  Jurors currently make decisions about character 
based on stereotypes and labels.  This is a huge disadvantage to defendants 
who do not have ways to counteract the prejudice.  One form of character 
evidence that might help alleviate the prejudice is psychologists’ testimony.  
They have the ability to educate the jury about the defendant’s culture.  
Aspects of the defendant’s character that may seem bad to the jury may turn 
out to be cultural, such as the way Kabuo Miyamoto appears to the jury in the 
novel Snow Falling on Cedars.  Lay character witnesses could be a less 
expansive alternative in many cases.  They may also help alleviate the 
prejudice in a number of ways, assuming a reform of good character evidence. 
 First, the witnesses may have stories to tell about the accused’s life that 
humanizes her in the eyes of the jury.  Second, character witnesses may have 
backgrounds that the jurors can relate to, either racial similarity to the jurors or 
middle class indicia such as a job, family and home.  The fact that they know, 
like, and interact with the defendant may dissipate the prejudice.  Third, 
character witnesses from the same background as the defendant may have the 
kind of personality that jurors will like, and that will dissipate the stereotypes 
and therefore help alleviate the prejudice against the defendant. 
The most serious danger in expanding good character evidence is that it 
will only help those who are middle class or upper class, those with lifestyles 
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that the jury will view as worthwhile.  If this is true, then these proposed 
changes would only further the divide between the haves and have-nots, with 
many of the non-affluent defendants being immigrants or persons of color.  On 
the other hand, the status quo supports the use of stereotyping.  The current 
lack of good character evidence adversely impacts many defendants of color 
who may have friends, family and co-workers who can help cross the divide.  
Since those with privilege are advantaged by the current system, the expansion 
of good character evidence will make the greatest difference for defendants 
who do not have the usual trappings of good character, such as job, marital 
status, or home ownership, but who have led good lives. 
This article makes several recommendations to shift the balance back in 
favor of defendants.  First, I propose reforms to 404(b), eliminating “intent” 
and “identity” as exceptions and requiring that the evidence truly be 
introduced for non-propensity reasons.  I also would urge the repeal of new 
laws that expand bad character evidence.203 
This article also recommends that the rules of good character evidence be 
expanded to include specific acts of good character.  Defendants should be 
given the right to tell the jury about their life, hardships, triumphs, and human 
connections.  This would be in addition to the conclusory opinions about 
character traits that are allowed in most jurisdictions, and in addition to 
reputation evidence, although this rarely used “right” may become extinct 
when other options are available to defense counsel.  Given that the principle 
reason against expanding good character is the time it takes to delve into these 
issues, I propose that this right be time limited.  Perhaps a rule can be 
structured to allow two hours worth of good character evidence for most trials, 
longer for murder cases or life felonies.204  Counsel shall be given latitude 
whether to use those hours to call an expert or to put on lay witnesses who 
know the defendant personally or professionally.  The right should no longer 
be limited to “traits” that are considered pertinent to the charge, but should 
allow a defendant to be humanized in whatever manner that counsel considers 
effective in alleviating the stigma of being accused. 
                                                 
203. I urge the repeal of the amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) that allows bad 
character traits to be introduced when defense counsel brings up similar bad character traits against the 
alleged victim.  I also urge the repeal of Rules 413-415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which specifically 
allow propensity evidence to be introduced. 
 
204. The time should not include objections by opposing counsel or discussions with the judge.  
Cross-examination of these witnesses should also be time limited.  Cross-examination should not be longer 
than the direct. 
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Finally, this article recommends that despite Michelson’s holding allowing 
impeachment with bad acts as a tax upon defense counsel’s introduction of 
good character evidence, the statutes should be adjusted to severely restrict the 
penalty against good character.  If the defendant puts on good character, the 
prosecution should only be able to introduce criminal convictions, not 
introduce arrests or unsubstantiated allegations.205  As we can see from the 
George Washington illustration, the penalty against good character evidence is 
so sweeping it nullifies the right. 
While a change in the rules should bring an increase in the use of good 
character evidence, it will still be used only in a minority of cases.  Many 
defendants will not benefit by the rule changes, particularly defendants with 
prior convictions.  Many defendants with prior convictions already give up 
their right to testify in order to keep them out.  For those defendants, the bias 
problems discussed in this article will need another solution.  For these 
defendants, the most important change will be ridding trials of prior bad acts 
that rely on propensity reasoning to meet the relevance threshold. 
                                                 
205. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.  The federal rules currently allow the prosecutor to 
introduce good character of a government witness through opinion or reputation.  FED. R. EVID. 608.  This 
article is not recommending any change in those rules.  The need for expansion of the type of good character 
evidence a defendant can put on is created by current social attitudes towards criminals and people charged 
with crimes.  No corresponding animosity exists towards victims or witnesses.  If the prosecution is allowed 
to bring in other forms of bad character on cross, voir dire should be used liberally to ensure a good faith 
basis for other negative behavior before it is set before the jury. 
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A change in the rules will require defense counsel to talk to character 
witnesses and prepare a whole other dimension to the trial.  One could say it 
forces criminal trial lawyers to act more like solicitors than barristers.  On the 
other hand, knowing one’s client fully is part of the disposition aspect of any 
case, so lawyers generally should be putting effort into learning their clients’ 
good points whether for a plea or for argument before a judge if the client is 
convicted.  Moreover, the new emphasis in the academy on knowing one’s 
clients and client-centeredness would be enhanced by rules that actually gave 
space within jury trials for sharing the fruits of these labors.206 
In literature, trials are the story within a story.  Novels, biographies and 
histories all deal with character as the motivator of human behavior.  When we 
read, we often think about the psychology of the individual.  Good literature 
informs us of how complicated it is to understand people.  It may be 
impossible for a trial to accomplish what a novel can do to lay out character in 
any depth or honesty.  Yet, this article has hopefully laid out the negative 
consequences caused by lack of information about good character.  Certainly 
jurors look at character in trials the same way readers do, trying to draw 
meaning from the clues.  Defense lawyers use good character evidence to 
suggest that someone who has acted well in the past is unlikely to have 
committed the crime charged.  Good character evidence allows someone who 
had a blameless life to gather the benefit of his prior actions when accused of a 
crime. 
In every trial, defense counsel needs to find ways to humanize the 
accused, to offset the sting of the accusation, to drive home the presumption of 
innocence.  Good character evidence, including evidence of prior good acts, 
should be one method of humanizing the accused. 
 
206. Jacobs, supra note 173, at 373.  (Professor Jacobs writes:  “[H]ow can she [the lawyer] assist the 
listener (court, prosecutor, jury) in understanding the client’s story when the court itself is unfamiliar with 
the client’s contextual experience?”).  According to Jacobs, “[w]e need to begin educating the courts about 
our clients’ lives and stories, outside of the adversarial context, so that our attempts to ‘empower’ our clients 
do not become empty rhetoric.”  Id. at 402. 
